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Notes and Comment
ConstitutionalLaw: Censorshipof Moving Pictures.-Inthe recent
case of Buffalo Branch, Mutual Film Corporation v. Breitinger, 95
Atl. (Pa.)433 (z915), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was called
upon to determine the validity of the Act of June xg, 191x, providing
for the appointment of a State Board of Censors to regulate the operation and exhibition of moving picture films. The court upheld the
act as being a valid exercise of the police power.,
Wherever the question of such censorship has arisen, the courts
have uniformly declared in favor of its constitutionality' and it has
even received the sanction of theSupreme Court of the UnitedStates.'
In the case of Mutual Film Corporationv. The IndustrialCommission
of Ohio,' where a similar statute enacted in Ohio was attacked, it
was urged that the act abridged
the "freedom of the press" as secured
4
by the state constitution.
The courts have rarely been called upon to construe "freedom
of the press," for the idea of a muzzled press is so foreign to the spirit
of our government that seldom has any attempt been made to
restrict expression of opinion. To find what is meant by "freedom
of the press" one must look to the condition of the law previous to the
enactment of the constitution, for its language asstunes by implication the prior existence of such right. In 1641, during the reign of
Charles I, the " odious" Star Chamber of England assumed the licensing of books and newspapers. It aroused such dissatisfaction that,
with the event of the Great Rebellion, Parliament abolished such
restraint entirely. Judge Mansfield, in King v. Dean of St. Asaph,5
defined "liberty of the press" as being the right to print "without
any previous restraint, subject only to the consequences thereof."
This view was adopted by Blackstone 6 and has been followed by
the American courts
Indeed the Supreme Court of the United
States itself approved this view, declaring it was too certain to need
discussion "that opinion is free and conduct alone amenable to the
law."" In accordance with such construction it has generally been
held that this constitutional provision prohibits equitable interference
by injunction to restrain the publication of a libel.' Freedom of
the press is in substance freedom from censorship.
'Block v. Chicago,

239

Ill.
251 (i9o9); Higgins v. Lacroix,

119

Minn. 145

(1912).

'Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230 (1914).
2

supra, note 2.
'Constitution of Ohio, Art. I, sec. ii.
'3 Term Rep. (Eng.) 428, note.
7'Cooley's Blackstone (4 th ed.), p. 1326.
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304 (1825); Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates (Pa.) 267 (18o5); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 4.54 (1907);
similar expressions in State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18 (igoo); Clothing Co. v.
Watson, 168 Mo. 133 (1902).
$See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, supra,note 2, at p. 243.
9Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., iio Mo. 492,500 (1892); Life Ass.
v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173 (1876).
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The United States Supreme Court, however, brushed aside this
contention and held that the exhibition of moving pictures was not
to be regarded as part of the "press" of Ohio. It is submitted that
the court was probably influenced in reaching such decision by
the manifest capability for evil in the unrestricted exhibition of
moving pictures. The difference between the "graphic representation of ideis" by means of print and by reflected pictures seems
hardly justifiable. Such a construction would allow the arbitrary
censorship of "cartoons", a conclusion which the court would hardly
adopt. The opposite construction would be in line with the case of
Daily v. Superior Court,'0 in which the court decided that a court
order enjoining the production of a play would violate freedom of the
press, and such is the opinion of a noted writer on the police power."
In this connection the case of Kalem v. Harper Bros., 2 in which
moving pictures were accorded the name of drama, is important.
In the principal case, however, the court dwelt mainly upon the
question as to whether this was a taking of property without due
process and so under the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment of
the federal onstitution. That the state may enact regulations
for the preservation of public morals by virtue of the police power
is undoubted. 13 It is clear that the regulation of moving pictures comes properly within the range of supervision in the interests
of public morals and welfare, when one considers the phenomenal
growth of this form of amusement, its popularity and attractiveness
for immature minds, and its power of suggestion. But of necessity,
when the police power clashes directly with a constitutional guaranty,
it is the duty of the court to protect the-Tight granted by the constitution. Under the individualistic doctrines of the early judges, these
limitations were strictly enforced, but with the modem tendency
towards a paternalistic government, legislation has been upheld
under the police power even where it has deprived persons of property without due process of law, if the deprivation was not excessive
and public welfare demanded it. 14 This is well illustrated by the
case of Noble State Bank v. Haskell,5 where the court sustained
legislation providing for compulsory insurance upon banks, and the
cases in regard to the prohibition of the sale of liquor."
It is interesting to note in this connection, the bill which is pending
before Congress providing for a federal board of censors. If such bill
becomes law and the court is called upon to decide its validity, it seems
that such legislation would be declared unconstitutional as running
athwart the fifth amendment. It has generally been stated that
congress has no authority to enact legislation by virtue of the
Cal. 94 (1896).
"See Freund on Police Power (4th ed.)., sec. 47!.
10112

'2222 U.

S. 55 (1911).

' 3Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 11. 34o (1898); Gatewood v. North Carolina,
203 U. S. 531 (19o6).
"Powell v. Comm., i14 Pa. St. 265 (i886); Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25
(1877); see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in Chicago, B. & Q.
R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561,599 (19o6).
15219 U. S. 104 (x91r).
' 6Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (t887); Beer Co. v. Mass., supra, note 14.
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where the state has already exercised
police 'power, particularly
17
such jurisdiction.
Julius Stejnbrenner, '6.
Constitutional Law: Validity of Legislation Restricting Employment of Aliens, and Denying Them the Right to Engage in Lawful
Occupations.-Aliens have always been a favorite subject of state
legislation. At an early date the Supreme Court of the United
States had occasion to declare that the i4th amendment was sufficiently broad to include aliens within the protection of its guaranties.' But how far may a state legislature interfere with the rights
of an alien to secure employment and to obtain a livelihood, without
violating the provisions of the i 4th amendment?
In two very recent cases the Supreme Court of the United States
considered this question. In Heim v. McCall, 36 Supreme Court
Reporter 78 (i915), a statute of New York2 prohibiting the employment of aliens on public works was held constitutional and not a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. The principal basis of
the decision was that the state, like an individual, has the right to
determine the character of its employees; and that if a state may
prescribe the hours of labor which constitute a day's work for those
whom it employs, it may likewise and with equal right prescribe
the kind of laborers to be employed. In Truax v. Raich, 36 Supreme
Court Reporter 7 (ipi5), a statute of Arizona, prohibiting the employment of more than 20 per cent. aliens by any employer of more
than five workers, regardless of the kind or class of work, was declared unconstitutional, because it was an unjust discrimination
against aliens, and therefore a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. The state, so writes the court, cannot deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of
earning a livelihood.
These two cases may easily be distinguished in two particulars.
The latter is a restriction on the right of employment generally,
affecting all employments, while the former is confined to employment only on public works, leaving the whole field of private enterprise open to the alien. The latter is an arbitrary interfereneo with
' 7Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12 (1883); Solon v. State,
54 Tex. Cr. R. 261 (i9o8); U. S. v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 41 (1869).
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
'Yick
2
Sec. i4 of the Labor Law; New York Consol. Laws, chap. 36.
'Atldn v. Kansas, I9I U. S. 207 (1903). The effect of the earlier decisions of the
New York Court of Appeals (214 N. Y. 629 and 214 N.Y. 154), also sustaining the
validity of this statute, was most serious in New York City. At that time about
Io,ooo aliens were employed on subway construction, and it would have meant
much delay in the completion of the system, if the United States Supreme Court
had not suspended the operation of the law pending the appeal. Because of
the difficulty which would most likely ensue from an enforcement of this law, the
legislature by amendment (chap. 51 of the New York Laws of 19x5) made the
statute less severe by providing that aliens may be employed when citizens are
not available.
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private enterprise operated by individuals, while the former is
merely a requirement by the state in the capacity of an employer
as to the character of its employees. The court itself in the case of
Truax v. Raich draws this distinction. "The discrimination defined
by the act does not pertain to the regulation or distribution of the
public domain, or of the common property or resources of the people
of the state, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens
as against both aliens and the citizens of other states." As authority
the court cites two illustrative cases. A statute in effect forbidding an alien to plant oysters in a certain river and another
statute5 prohibiting the killing of wild game by aliens were both
sustained.
In connection with Heim v. McCall, it is interesting to note the
decision of People v. Warren6 which declared a New York statute,
making it a crime for a contractor for the construction of public
works to employ aliens, unconstitutional. The decision, however,
seems to have been rendered in respect to the rights of the employer
and not with regard to those of the alien employee.
Various state courts have from time to time rendered somewhat
conflicting decisions in respect to the validity of similar restrictions.
A statute of Michigan,7 providing that no alien shall be entitled to
a barber's license, was declared unconstitutional as a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. A statute of Maine,8 which in effect
prohibited the issuing of a peddler's license to an alien, was declared
void as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. But, on the other
hand, a statute of Massachusetts exactly similar in effect to that of
Maine received an entirely different construction and was held valid
as a reasonable exercise of the police power.9 Likewise a statute
of Maryland confining the granting of licenses to sell intoxicating
liquors to citizens was uphela for the same reason.10 The Massachusetts court proceeded on the theory that, while a prohibition on
aliens engaging in ordinary kinds of business to earn their living would
be void, yet the business of peddling was a peculiar subject for the
police power because offering opportunities for the practice of fraud.
The Maryland court likewise believed that, as the privilege of selling
intoxicants was liable to abuse to the detriment of the public, it
waswithin the discretion of the legislature to conferit only on citizens,
who might reasonably be supposed to have regard for the public
welfare."
Statutes prescribing citizenship as a requirement for admission
to the bar have been uniformly upheld, presumably upon the theory
4

McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1876).
TPatsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914).
7613 Misc. (N. Y.) 615 (1895).

Templar v. Barber's Board of Examiners,
8State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192 (1900).

13i

Mich. 254

$Commonwealth v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262 (1907).

(1902).

"Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250 (189o).
"See also State v. Kofines, 33 R. I. 21H (I911); State v. Ames, 47 Wash. 328
(1907); Fraser v. McConway & Co., 82 Fed. 257 (1897); Ex parte Kuback, 85
Cal. 274 (189o); In Re Tiburcio Parrott, I Fed. 481 (188o); In Re Ah Chong,
2 Fed. 733 (1880).
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that the practice of law is a privilege and not a right, and that by
The
being admitted to the bar one becomes an officer of the court.
law on this point is so definitely settled that further citation of
authority seems unnecessary.
Selby G. Smith, 'z6.
Contracts: Obscured Limitations.-It is a wide-spread custom
among manufacturers, wholesalers and jobbers to have placed on
their stationery a clause attempting to incorporate into contracts,
made on such stationery, a condition making these agreements
contingent upon strikes, fires, unavoidable accidents, and delays
beyond their control. Because of the conventional nature of the
clause, its usually inconspicuous position, and the small size of the
type in which it is generally printed, an interesting question arises
as to its efficacy in accomplishing its intended object. In B. F.
Sturtevant Co. v. The FireproofFilm Co., 216 N. Y. x99 (1915), such
a limiting clause was held not a part of the contract and, therefore,
ineffectual. The plaintiff submitted to the defendant a voluminous
typewritten proposal with specifications, with a view to selling blower
equipment. Upon the proposal the defendant endorsed, "Accepted,
Fireproof Film Co., H. Kuhn, Vice-president and Treasurer." At
the bottom of the first page of the proposal, in fine type, appeared
the printed clause, "All agreements are contingent upon strikes, fires,
accidents, or delays beyond our control. All prices are subject
to change without notice and all contracts and orders taken are
subject to the approval of the executive office at Hyde Park, Mass."
The typewritten numeral denoting the first page of the proposal
was written over a part of the clause.
After plaintiff started work on the contract, defendant sought to
cancel it and plaintiff sued for breach of the contract. Ao evidence
was introduced to show that the contract had been approved by
plaintiff's home office as provided in the above-quoted clause, and
defendant relied upon this fact in maintaining that the so-called
contract was never complete. The court based its holding for the
plaintiff on the ground that the position of the clause, the size of the
type and the conditions in general do not warrant the assumption that
it was intended to be a part of the contract. This appears to be the
first instance where this situation has been litigated in New York,
although it has come up in other states. In Summers v. Hibbard &
Co., 153 Ill. 7o2 (1894), it was held that such a printed clause will
not excuse liability for delay where a definite time for delivery is
stated in the written part of the instrument.
Cases of this sort may be analyzed upon three hypotheses, viz.:
i. That both parties may have known of the clause, but had no
intention of incorporating it into the contract; 2. That one of the
parties knew of the matter, but the other had insufficient notification
of it; 3. That the clause is a part of the contract, but is inconsistent
with some written term of it.
1
2In the Matter of O'Neill, 90 N. Y. 584 (1882); In Re Admission to the Bar,
6I Neb. 58 (19oo); In Re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163 (189o).
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This recent New York case seems, from the opinion of the court,
to fall in the first of the above classes, as no sufficient evidence appears
of a mutual intent to incorporate the limitation into the contract.
The plaintiff, of course, knew of its own printed condition, but the
fact that the clause was regarded as of no material importance is
evidenced by the obliteration or defacing of part of it by the typewritten numeral.
The cases included in the second class find an analogy in the long
line of railroad ticket cases in which the carrier seeks to limit its
liability for baggage to a specified amount.

The whole question

hinges upon the presence or absence of adequate notice to the passenger of the existence of the contractual limiting clause.' The
clause cannot be contractual without mutual consent and there can
be no consent; unless there is acceptance of the instrument "with
notice of its contents, or notice that it contained the terms of a
special contract."lu

It is held that, where the ticket appears to be

a mere receipt or check and not a contract and yet has the clause
on the back, such clause is inoperative. 2 Where the limiting clause
was referred to by the words, "Look on the back," printed in fine
type on the front, it has been left to the jury to say whether the
notice was adequate. 3 A passenger to whom a folded ticket was
given, as a matter of law, has been held not chargeable with knowledge of a limiting clause printed thereon, even though aware that there
was printing of some kind on the ticket, but not notified in any way
that it was other than a mere receipt to be given up in exchange
for passage. 4 So, too, when a receipt was given by an express company under circumstances such that it could be read only with
difficulty, it has been held that the limited liability clause embodied
in the receipt was of noavail. 5
In the third class, if it be decided that the clause is included in
the contract 6, then the well-settled rules as to a contract combining
written and printed matter may be applied. In such an instrument
where written and printed terms conflict, those govern which are
typewritten or in manuscript.7 However, if it is possible to reconcile
such terms, effect must be given to both.s
Whatever view be taken of these cases, the efficacy of limiting
clauses, as they are generally printed, is a matter of doubt, and, if
the reservation of non-liability from unavoidable delays is desirable,
'Springerv. Westcott, I66 N. Y. 127 (1901); Grace v. Adams, 1oo
505 (1868); Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 553 (1891).
IaSpringer v. Westcott, supra, note i.
2
Brown v. Eastern Railroad Co., II Cush. (Mass.) 97 (z1853).
3

Mass,

Malone v. B. & W. Railroad Corporation, 12 Gray (Mass.) 388 (1859).
Richardson, Spence & Co. v. Rowntree, (1894) App. Cas. 217.
Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264 (1870).
6Sturm v. Boker, r5o U. S. 312 (1893); Menz Lumber Co. v. McNeeley & Co.,
58 Wash. 223 (1910).
7Clark v. Woodruff, 83 N. Y. 518 (1881); Sprague Electric Co. v. Board of
4

Comrs.
of Hennepin Co., 83 Minn.
8

262 (1901).

Hutt v. Zimmer, 78 Hun (N. Y.) 23 (1894); Eager v. Mathewson, 27 Nev.
220 (1903); Hardie-Tynes Fdy. & Mach. Co. v. Glen Allen Oil Mill, 84 Miss.
259 (1904.)
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the only safe course is explicitly to incorporate the limiting clause
in the body of the contract.
Donald H. Hershey, '8.
CriminalLaw: Duty to Retreat.-Inthe case of People v. Tomlins,
N. Y. 240 (1914), the defendant shot and killed his son. The
defendant set up, among other defenses, that he had acted justifiably
in self-defense, in his own house. The court charged that if the
defendant "could have gotten off the porch, and gone across the lot
and down the road, or around the house, or anywhere to a place of
safety, then the law says he should have done so, and he had no
right to use the weapon against his son, unless all reasonable means
of retreating were cut off, and he was being threatened with bodily
injury." On appeal the court held that this charge was erroneous,
saying that, where a man is attacked in his own house, he need not
flee as far as he can, and that, if the situation justifies the defendant
as a reasonable man in believing that he is about to be murderously
assaulted, he has the right to stand his ground.
This seems to be the general rule in this country, and also in line
with the precedents in this state.' In the principal case the court
distinguished the case of People v. Sullivan,2 and held that it was in
line with precedent and not in conflict with the case at bar. In the
Sullitun case, the defendant and the murdered man were roomers
in a lodging house, their rooms being on different floors. The
affray started in the defendant's room, but the two men separated
and the deceased went to the foot of the stairs. Here he turned
and went back, meeting the defendant on the landing of the stairway, where the fight was resumed and the murder committed.
The court, with reference to that situation, charged that it was
Sullivan's duty to avoid the attack if in his power to do so, and the
right of self-defense would not arise until he had done everything
in his power to avoid the necessity. This case, however, is easily
distinguished from those cases where the attack is made in the dwelling. Here the conflict was not in the defendant's room, but in the
hall at the head of the stairway. There is, in fact, no duty to retreat
from a room rented and occupied as a bedroom.3 But the fact that
one has a room in the house does not exempt him
from retreating
4
when attacked in another room in the same house.
The reason for this rule regarding attacks upon a person in his
dwelling, is that, at common law, a man's house was his castle,
and was considered as a place of retreat and of safety. As said in the
principal case, to require a man to retreat from his own dwelling would
be similar to forcing him to abandon his only real place of refuge.
This exemption in respect to a man's dwelling seems also to extend
to the buildings within the curtilage of the dwelling. 4a In a Michigan
213

'State v. Gentry, 125 N. C. 733 (1899); People v. Crowe, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas.
(N. Y.) 152 (1850); Pond v. People, 8 Mich. i5o (i86o).
27 N. Y. 396 (1852).
'Harris v. State, 96 Ala. 24 (1891).
'State v. Dyer, 147 Iowa 217 (1910).
4
7'eev.
State, 92 Ala. 15 (i8go); Beardv. State, 158 U. S. 550 (1895); State v.
Brooks, 7 a, S. C. r44 (z9o7).
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case 5 a building thirty-six feet distant from the dwelling was
held to be within the curtilage, though not included with the house
by a fence.
The principle involved in these cases suggests the general question
as to when there is a duty to retreat. Homicide in self-defense at
common law was either justifiable or excusable. 6 Justifiable
homicide was where a person was feloniously assaulted, being without fault himself, and necessarily killed his assailant to save himself
from death, bodily harm or some other felony attempted by force
or surprise. Excusable homicide was where it occurred in repelling
an attack not made with a felonious intent, and the person necessarily, or under reasonably apparent necessity, killed his adversary.
By the English common law in those cases where the homicide
was excusable, the person assaulted, except in his own house, was
bound to retreat to the wall.7 But, where a man feloniously assaulted
another with intent to kill him, or to inflict great bodily harm, the
person assaulted, being without fault, could stand his ground and
kill his assailant, if it was apparently necessary to save himself."
The phrase "retreat to the wall" must be taken figuratively, as indicating a retreat to the limits of personal safety. The true view seems
to be that a "wall" or "ditch" is to be presumed whenever retreat
cannot be further continued without probable death, and when the
only apparent means of escape is to attack the assailant. 9
In the American jurisdictions which recognize this common
law distinction the rule seems to be that, where the homicide is
merely excusable, the defendant is under a duty to retreat, and must
do all that is reasonably within his power to avoid the necessity for
extreme resistance. 10 But, where the homicide is justifiable, there
seems to be a divergence in the rules laid down by the various states.
In some states, in the case of a felonious attack, it is held that one
is under no duty to retreat, although he could do so with safety."
In other states, 12 including New York, where the distinction between
excusable and justifiable homicide has been done away with by
statute,"3 the common-law rule of "retreat to the wall" seems to hold,
where the defendant was violently and feloniously assaulted, even
where he was without fault in bringing on the difficulty. In the case
of People v. Minisci 4 the defendant was attacked with a razor, and,
after retreating a few steps, he shot and killed his assailant. The
'Pond
v. People, supra, note
6

i.

Fost. C. L. 273; Beale's Cas., 326.
I Hale, P. C. 483.
al Hale, P. C. 40; i East P. C. 271.
24 Bl. Com. 185; Fost. C. L. 273; Commonwealth v. Ellenger, i Brewst.
(Pa.)
352 (1867).
1
State v. Clark, 5I W. Va. 457 (1902); State v. Gentry, supra,note x.
nPeople v. Newcomber, 118 Cal. 263 (1897); Harris v. People, 32 Colo. 211
(1904); Fields v. State, 134 Ind. 46 (1892); State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420 (1896);
Rowe v. United States, 164 U. S. 546 (1896).
"Kirkland v. State, 141 Ala. 45 (1904); State v. Talley, 9 Houst. (Del.) 417
(1886); People v. Constantino, 153 N. Y. 24 (1897); People v. Kennedy, 159
N. Y. 346 (1899); Commonwealth v. Ellinger, supra, note 9.
"New York Penal Law, sec. lO55.
"412 N. Y. St. Rep. 719 (1887).
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court charged that the defendant was bound to retreat and avoid
the attack, if possible, but added that "if he has retreated as far as
he can, and cannot avoid the attack, he has the right to defend
himself even to killing his assailant." In another comparatively
recent New York case, People v. Malt,,n,15 a requested instruction
that, if the accused believed himself to )ein danger of bodily harm,
he was justified in killing his assailant, and one who is without fault,
when attacked, may kill his assailant, where the circumstances are
such as to furnish reasonable grounds for apprehending a design
to do him great bodily harm, was held to be properly refused, because
it failed to include the rule that the accused was bound to retreat
from the threatened danger, if he could, without taking life in selfdefense. The Mallon case shows the present view of the New York
courts and it would seem that in this state a person is bound to
retreat if possible, in all cases, except where the attack is made in
the defendant's dwelling. The question of how far one is bound
to retreat before killing his assailant, in order to make the killing
justifiable homicide, depends on the suddenness and violence of
the attack, the imminence of the danger, and the age and physical
strength of the parties.'
The modem tendency is toward a more liberal rule than that
followed in New York State, some jurisdictions even going so far
as to abrogate the common-law rule. In those states where it has
been abrogated any person unlawfully attacked is not required to
flee, but if he resists the attack he is held answerable for excessive
force. 17 In Minnesota the rule has been modified in accordance
with changed conditions. 18 Colorado holds the doctrine applicable
only where the defendant voluntarily entered into the fight or the
parties engaged in a mutual combat, or where the defendant was
the assailant and had not declined further struggle.1 9 These courts,
however, still recognize the rule that the right of self-defense is
founded on necessity, and hold that one who would invoke it must
avoid the attack if he can do so without danger.
W. J. Gilleran, 'z8.
Criminal Law: Homicide: The Act Causing Death: Other Contributing Causes as a Defense.-In the recent case of People v. Kane,
213 N. Y. 26o (1915), a pregnant woman had been shot by the defendant. The bullet entered the right arm, fractmired the sixth rib
and lodged in the right lung. The woman was taken to a hospital,
and after a short time she suffered a miscarriage, which, combined
with some negligence on the part of the attendants in treating her,
caused blood-poisoning and resulting death.
The trial court charged the jury "that if the shooting was the cause
of a miscarriage, and if the result of the miscarriage was death,
(N. Y.) 425 (19o6).
v. Garretson, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 347 (1823).
State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 7'67 (1894); State v. Sherman, 16 R. I. 631 (1889);
McCall v. State, 29 So. (Miss.) 1003 (1901); State v. Hatch, supra, note ii.
"State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318 (19o5).
"Boyld v. People, 22 Colo. 496 (1896); Harris v. People, supra,note II.
15189 N. Y. 520 (1907), affirming 116 App. Div.
16
People
1
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even though there may have intervened some disease, like bloodpoisoning, then if that relation of cause and effect is traceable from
the shooting * * * up to the point of her death, it caused her death
in the eyes of the law." This was held to contain no error and the
court said, "if a felonious assault is operative as a cause of death,
the casual co-operation of erroneous surgical or medical treatment
does not relieve the assailant from liability for the homicide."
This decision is based upon the general rule of homicide "that he
whose act causes in any way, directly or indirectly, the death of
another, kills him within the meaning of the law."' The rule,
in turn, is derived from the fundamental principle "that everyone
is held to contemplate and
'2 to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts."

To apply this general principle to homicide, it is convenient to
follow four illustrations: First, where pre-existing weakness or
disease operates with the wrongful act as a cause of the death;
second, where a subsequent disease is the immediate cause; third,
where there is negligence in the treatment of the wound; and fourth,
where the death results from the effects of an independent act.
First: Where a Pre-existingWeakness or Disease uth the Wrongful
Act is a Cause of the Death.
The general rule is that "if an injury causes death, the person
who inflicted it cannot escape responsibility for the homicide by
showing that the deceased, by reason of disease or drunkenness,
or other physical infirmity was more susceptible to the fatal effects
than was reasonably to be expected." 3 In early English law Parke,
B., charged the jury in a case where such a defense was attempted:
"It is said that the deceased was in a bad state of health, but that
is perfectly immaterial, as, if the prisoner was so unfortunate as
''
4
to accelerate her death, he must answer for it.
This rule has been
5
generally followed, even to the extent of cases where the deceased
was in the last stage of consumption and the inflicted wound was
not an ordinarily mortal one.' And also to cases where the deceased
was languishing of a mortal wound at the time of the defendant's
act.7 In such cases, if there is no community of purpose, the last
inflicted blow is the responsible one and not the first.9 All that is
necessary is that the death be accelerated, or the previous wound
be aggravated.
12

Bishop's New Cr. Law, sec. 636.

2Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558 (1910).
3Clark
& Mar. Cr. Law, sec. 237.
4

Rex. v. Mertin, 5 Car. & P. 126, 128 (1832).
5People v. Moan, 65 Cal. 532 (1884); Griffin v. State, 4o Tex. Cr. R.
(1899); Hollywood v. State, i9 Wryo. 493 (191).
6State v. Morea, 2 Ala. 275 (1841).
7Hopkins v. Commonwealth, I17 Ky. 941 (1904);
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People v. Moan, supra,

note 5.
'People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 6r (1874); Fisher v. State, io Lea (Tenn.) 151
(1882); Dugue v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 214 (19o9); Talley v. State, 174 Ala.
101 (1912); Rogers v. State, 6o Ark. 76 (1894).
9State v. Scates, 5o N. C. 420 (1858).
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Second: Disease as the Immediate Cause of Death.
"It is an ancient and well-settled principle of the law of homicide,
that, if a wound causes a disease which produces death, the death
is imputable to the wound." This is the law as applied in a Texas
case'0 where the deceased was shot in the knee-joint, and died over
a month after the shooting and after two intervening attacks of
colic and other complications. Yet the court held-that the "corpus
delicti was sufficiently established" and convicted the assailant.
The Georgia court applied the same rule in a recent case where the
deceased was shot in the leg and died ten days later from bloodSimilar results have been reached when the immediate
poisoning.
12
lockjaw, 3 pneumonia, 14 empyema t5
cause of the death was fright,
6
and overdose of morphine.1
But, where scarlet fever was negligently communicated to the
wounded person by an attendant, it was held to be a purely indecause so that the accused was not responsible
pendent, intervening
17
for the homicide.
Third: Negligence in the Treatment of the Wound.
(a) The wounded person's own neglect. Rew's case8 laid down
the doctrine "that if one gives wounds to another, who neglects
the cure of them, or is disorderly and doth not keep the rule which
a person wounded should do; yet if he die, it is murder or manslaughter according as the case is * * * , because if the wounds had
not been, the man had not died, and therefore neglect or disorder
in the person who received the wounds shall not excuse the person
who gave them."
Refusal on the part of the wounded person to submit to proper
medical treatment or surgical operation, is also no defeise to the
homicide. In Regina v. Holland,9 there was a refusal to have the
injured fingers amputated, although the physician said that bloodpoisoning would set in if this was not done. But the refusal was
held to be immaterial, so far as the original
20 wrong-doer was concerned. And this seems to be the law now.
(b) Negligence of others. "The well-established rule of common
law would seem to be that if the wound was a dangerous one, that
is calculated to endanger or destroy life, and death ensued therefrom * * * the person who inflicted it is responsible, though it may
appear * * * that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the
wound and contributed to the death." 2' This rule with slight
' 0Powel v. State, 13 Tex. App. 244 (1882).
"Clements v. State, x41 Ga. 667 (914); State v. Strong, I53 Mo. 548 (1900).
"People v. Cox, 8o N. Y. 500 (I88O).

"State v. Blantley, 44 Conn. 537 (1877); State v. Harmon,
853 (1915).
"4Quinn
v. State, 64 So. (Miss.) 738 (i914).
5
State v. Wood, 112 Ia. 411 (900).
'People v. Cook, 39 Mich. 236 (1878).

92

Atl. (Del.)

"7Bush
v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 268 (I88O).
13
Rex. v. Rew, J. Kelyng 26 (1662);" also see i Hawkins Ch. i3, see. io.
1'2
Moody and R. 351 (1841).
20Franklin v. State, 4I Tex. Cr. R. 21 (1899).
"'Commonwealth v. Hackett, 2 Allen (Mass.) I36 (i86i).
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modification is law in most jurisdictions at the present time.22 "To
exonerate one who has inflicted a dangerous wound it must appear
not only that the operation was performed in a grossly negligent
and unskillful manner, but also was the sole cause of the death,
and not one of a series of intermediate causes, following in the train
of the injury, the original cause * * *
When the accused inflicts the
injury that necessitates the -operation, he is held to assume the risk
attendant on it."21
So in a case where a lost drainage tube, that had been inserted
by the surgeon after an operation to remove the bullet, found its
-way into the spinal canal and caused death, the defendant was
nevertheless convicted,2 as was also the result in a case where the
death was caused some five months after the shooting, by the breaking off by an attendant
of a glass catheter which had been inserted
25
in the bladder.

Lord Hale,2 6 in his Pleas to the Crown, maintains that if the wound
is not mortal, and "it can clearly appear that the medicine and not
the wound was the cause of the death, it seems that it is not homicide." The more general rule is that the wound must be "dangerous," as quoted in Commonwealth v. Hackett,2 although some cases2
follow Hale. Others 9 place no importance whatever upon whether
the wound was mortal or not, and this seems to be the better view.
One state has provided by statute tho t gross negligence and manifestly improper medical treatment will relieve the accused of responsibility for the homicide. 30
Fourth: Death Resulting from the Effect of Independently Intervening Act.
(a) Intervening Act of Others. "If one man inflicts a mortal
wound, of which the victim is languishing, and then a second kills
the deceased by an independent act, we cannot imagine how the
first can be said to have killed him, without involving the absurdity
of saying that the deceased was killed twice." 3' But this applies
only to separate and independent acts. When two persons are acting
in concert, the court will not stop to "speculate upon which (blow)
2
1'harp v. State, 51 Ark. 147 (i888); Coffman v. Commonwealth, io Bush.
(Ky.) 495 (7874); Commonwealth v. Costley, 18 Mass. i (1875); People v.
Cook, supra, note 16, Downing v. State, 114 Ga. 3o (19O1); Allen v. State, 133
Ga. 26o (19o9); Perdue v. State I35 Ga. 277 (19o); Daughdrill v. State, 113
Ala. 7 (x896); Johnson v. State, 64 Fla. 321 (1912).
wOdeneal v. State, 157 S.W. (Tenn.) 419 (1913); McCoy v. Commonwealth,
149 Ky. 447 (1912); State v. Gabriella, 163 Ia. 297 (1913); People v. Williams,
147 Pac. (Cal.) 768 (1915).
2Commonwealth v. Eisenhower, 18i Pa. St. 470 (1897).
25Hambin v. State, 81 Neb. 148 (1908).

Hale's P. C. 428.
"Supra, note 22.
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"Parsons v. State, 21 Ala. 3oo (1852); Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14
592 (1857); Tibbs v. Commonwealth, supra, note 2. And see
note, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665.
"State v. Morphy, 33 Ia. 270 (1871); State v. Gabriella, supra, note 23;
U. S. v. Escallona, 12 Philippine R. 54 (19o8); see also 21 Cyc. 695.
3'Tex. Penal Code, sec. 652, 653.
3"State v. Scates, 5o N. C. 42o (1858); see also Wharton on Horn. (2d ed.),
sec. 363; Wilson v. State, 24 S.W. (Tex.) 409 (1893).

Gratt. (Va.)
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actually
caused the death", but will hold both responsible as prin32
cipals.
"If, however, a wound is feloniously inflicted in such a manner
as to put life in jeopardy, and death ensues as a consequence of that
act, the fact that another injury was afterwards inflicted by another
person, does not palliate or excuse the first felonious act."n Thus,
where the defendant and the deceased were fighting, and the defendant stabbed him, but, before the fight was over, the defendant's
eleven-year-old son, to assist his father, shot the deceased, the
court held that, if the knife wound contributed to the death, it was a
cause of the death, although there was no community of purpose
between the father and his son. 34
(b) Intervening Act of Wounded Person. If the wounded person
intervenes as a responsible agent, the defendant will not be held
accountable, unless his act naturally contributed to the death.
Thus, in a case where an intoxicated man beat his wife, and after
he had gone to sleep, she started out for her parents' home, but
became weary and went to sleep in a field and died from exposure,
the court held that her voluntary act of exposure was the real and
independent cause
of the death, and that the husband was not
3
responsible for it. 1
But, if the act of the defendant contributed to the death, the
law will take judicial notice of that fact.3 6 An extreme illustration
of this is seen in the California decision of People v. Lewis. 37 In
that case the defendant inflicted a necessarily mortal wound upon
the deceased. But the latter procured a knife and cut his throat,
from which, according to the medical testimony, he must have died
in five minutes. The court sustained a verdict of guilty on the ground
that "the deceased was actually dying at the time of his own act * * *
and after the throat was cut he continued to languish from both
wounds. Drop by drop the life current went out from both wounds
and at the very instant of death the gunshot wound was contributing
to the event."
However, it would seem more logical and reasonable to put conviction upon the grounds followed by the West Virginia court in
the recent case of State v. Angelina,3 where the facts were materially
the same. The court there said that, although the self-inflicted
wound may have been the proximate cause of the death, yet it
"was not the act of an intervening responsible agent, but of one rendered irresponsible by the wound inflicted by the defendant, and as a
natural result of that wound."
In general, the weight of authority appears to agree with the doctrine of causation followed in People v. Kane, supra, and to extend
32
Bennett v. Commonwealth, i5O Ky. 604 (1912). See also note 43 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 419; Espinoza v. State, 165 S. W. (Tex.) 208 (1910); Walker v. State,
in6 Ga. 537 (1902); note 67 L. R. A. 426; Jordan v. State, 82 Ala. 1 (1886);
Miller v. State, 37 Ind. 432 (1871); Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33 (1881).
23Wharton on Horn. (3rd ed.), sec. 33; State v. Hambright, i nN. C. 707 (3893).

'"Henderson v. State, ii Ala. App. 37 (1913).
2

4

'tate v. Preslar, 3 Jones (N. C.

S. W. (Ky.) 1127 (1897).
3

)421

'State v. Hambright, supra, note 33.

37I24 Cal. 551 (1899).

3873 W. Va. 446 (1914).

(1856);

Lewis v. Commonwealth.
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this principle more freely than in the past. The rule now seems
almost to be that "one is guilty if his act was the cause of the cause
of the death."39
0. R. Clark, 'r8.
Criminal Law: Trial of Accessory and Principal: Meaning of
"Conviction."--The recent case of Commonwealth v. Minnich, 95 AtI.
(Pa.) 565 (1915), raises an interesting question as to the meaning
of "conviction." The defendant was tried and found guilty of murder
in the second degree upon an indictment charging him with being
an accessory before the fact to the murder of one Mary Stoica, the
actual crime having been committed by one Harry Green. The
latter was found guilty by a jury of the offense charged. Upon
appeal in the principal case, Minnich's counsel alleged as error
the admission in evidence of the record of conviction of the principal against the objection of the defense that the record was insufficient, as it showed merely the return of a verdict of guilty and no
entry of judgment upon the verdict. The court, in sustaining this
assignment, ruled that the record of conviction of the principal to
be admissible in evidence at the trial of the accessory should recite
not only the entering of a verdict but the rendering of a judgment
or sentence upon that verdict.
This conclusion was based upon the theory that the guilt of the
principal should be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
court questioned whether a simple verdict was the "evidential
equivalent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." In the language
of Mr. Justice Stewart who delivered the opinion: "A verdict of
a jury, without more, is but the expression of the collective opinion
of twelve men, which concludes nothing and supports nothing except
as it is followed by a judgment; and then it is the judgment and
not the verdict that marks the conclusion of the issue and gives
it efficiency." In a similar case' at the same term of the court the
court commented favorably upon the doctrine of Commonwealth v.
Minnich, supra.
The machinery of the law provides no express manner in which the
guilt of the principal shall be ascertained. The law,2 however,
lays down the rule that there can be no conviction of the accessory
unless the guilt of the principal is first established. One of the modes
often resorted to in order to establish his guilt is the introduction
at the trial of the accessory of the record of conviction of the principal. This record has exceptional weight as matter of evidence,
since it is conclusive proof as to his conviction and prima facie
evidence of his guilt, which stands unless the contrary is shown.
Whether a record showing only the rendering of a verdict by a jury
is sufficient to establish the guilt of the principal depends upon the
meaning of conviction.
The word conviction is capable of two interpretations in criminal
cases, namely, in a technical sense as indicating a judgment of the
39

Wharton on Hom. (3d ed.), sec. 27.

'Commonwealth v. Vitale, 95 AtI. (Pa.) 723 (1915).
21

Wharton, Criminal Law, sec. 277; i Bishop, Criminal Law, p. 61I.
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court upon a verdict of guilty, and in common parlance as denoting
merely the verdict of a jury. While it may be applied, although
somewhat loosely, to civil cases, it is the purpose of this note to
discuss it with reference to criminal actions only.
By the apparent weight of authority of both decisions3 and textwriters, 4 conviction is construed to be the verdict of guilty by a
jury, except where the question of conviction is a question of evidence
in a subsequent case. Thus, where a reward was offered for the
prosecution and conviction of persons guilty of bribery, it was held
that the meaning of the word was satisfied by a verdict.' What it
signifies in popular language is well expressed by Mr. Justice Gray
in Commonwealth v. Lockwood; 6 "The ordinary legal meaning of
conviction, when used to designate a particular stage of a criminal
prosecution triable by a jury, is the confession of the accused in open
court, or the verdict returned against him by the jury, which ascertains and publishes the fact of his guilt; while judgment or sentence
is the appropriate word to denote the action of the court before which
the trial is had, declaring the consequences to the convict of the fact
thus ascertained."
But, where the guilt of one party as judicially proved in one case
is given in evidence in another, the courts7 seem to agree that its
technical sense should be attributed to it. In the opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals:8 "Where the reference is to the ascertainment of guilt in another proceeding, in its bearing upon the status
or rights of the individual in a subsequent case, then a broader
meaning attaches to the expression and a conviction is not established or a person deemed to have been convicted unless it is shown
that a judgment has been pronounced upon the verdict."
It appears to be settled law also, according to decisions9 and
text-writers, 10 that the record to be competent evidence of the conviction should show the rendering of a judgment upon the verdict.
In so deciding the principal case seems to have departed from the
doctrine of an earlier case, holding that it was not necessary to
3
People v. Goldstein, 32 Cal. 432 (1867); Quintard v. Knoedler, 53 Conn. 485
(1885); In re Friedrich, 5i Fed. Rep. 747 (1892); Commonwealth v. Lockwood,
1o9 Mass. 323 (1872); Munldey v. Hoyt, r79 Mass. io8 (I9OI); Peoplev. Adams,
95 Mich. 541 (1893); State v. Henson, 66 N. J. L. 6oi, 607 (1901); Shepherd v.
People, 25 N. Y. 406, 419 (1862); State v. Alexander, 76 N. C. 231 (1892); Blair
v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 850 (1874); Bugbee v. Boyce, 68 Vt. 311

(1895).

44 Blackstone's Commentaries, p. 362; i Bishop, Criminal Law, sec. 223;
i Bouvier Law Dictionary, p. 362. But see contra, I Greenleaf on Evidence,
see. 375.
5Wilmoth v. Hensel, II Pa. 200 (1892).
6io9 Mass. 323 (1872).
7
11ackett v. Freeman & Graves, io3 Iowa 296 (1897); Commonwealth v. Lock-.
wood, supra, note 6; People v. Fabian, 192 N. Y. 443 (i9o8); Smith v. Commonwealth, 14 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.) 69 (1826); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224
Pa. 363 (1909).
s192 N. Y. 323 (19o8).
9Daugherty v. State, 46 Fla. io9 (i903); State v. Duncan, 28 N. C. 236 (1846);
Buck v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 486 (1884); but see contra, Groves v. State,
76 Ga. 808 (1886); Cantrell v. State, 8o S. E. (Ga.) 649 (1913).
10 Bishop, Criminal Law, sec. 612; I Wharton, Criminal Law, sec. 277.
"Holmes v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 221 (1855).
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show the conviction, but that it was sufficient to establish the principal's guilt in some other manner.
Where the word conviction is used in a statute, 2 the difficulty as
to its meaning is again encountered. Being of equivocal meaning,
it cannot be uniformly construed and its construction depends upon
the context of the particular statute involved. Thus, in a Connecticut case, 3 where an act provided for a right of action on a bond
given by a person licensed to sell liquor, upon conviction of a violation of the statute, the court held that a verdict was intended.
Whereas in a Massachusetts case, 4 under a statute providing that
conviction of a crime might be shown to affect the credibility of a
witness, a judgment was held necessary to constitute a conviction.
The confusion here as to the term might be eliminated by a less
indiscriminate use of the word by our legislatures, and the insertion
into the statute of qualifying words to distinguish the two meanings.
This would prevent considerable waste of energy by our already
over-burdened courts in unnecessary litigation over its construction.
It would seem more in accord with the modem tendency of justice
and increased personal liberty that conviction should indicate judgment. A verdict is uncertain; it may be set aside or judgment upon
it arrested, on motion to that effect. To say that a man is convicted
when found guilty by twelve jurors is to deprive him of the right of
appeal and in addition to disqualify him for many other purposes,
as, for example, giving testimony, voting at elections and holding
any office of honor, trust or profit. A judgment would seem to be
the only sure method of establishing his guilt.
Leonard G. Aierstok, '17.
Employer's Liability: Meaning of "in the Course of the Employment."-The Workmen's Compensation Acts have thus far fared
better at the hands of the courts than most radical changes of the
common law. They are founded upon practical political economy,
and are the outcome of a long period of agitation for a better and more
modem industrial law; and the bench and bar have been educated,
if not to a receptive, at least to a neutral mood. But the majority
of lawyers, though trying to carry out the purpose of these acts, still
think in terms of the common law. Hence, though a sound decision
may be reached on purely economic and ethical principles, it will have
more weight if based upon legal reasoning.
Such is the case in Dragovitch v. Iroquois Iron Co., iop N. E. (Ill.)
999 (i915)- One Gornick was repairing steam pipes in the defendant's factory. A portion of the floor had been removed to facilitate
the work, and in the hole thus made a quantity of hot water had
collected. The steam given off fron this water hid the opening from
12Lx parte brown, 68 Cal. 176 (1885); Quintard v. Knoedler, 53 Conn. 485
(1885)i Cantreil v. State, 8o S. E. (Ga.) 649 (1913); Darst v. People, 51 Ill.
31 (r869); Commonwealth v. Gorham, 99 Mass, 42o (1868); Commonwealth

v. Kiley, i5o Mass. 325 (1889); Schiffer v. Pruden, 64 N. Y. 47 (1876); Blaufus
v. Peoole, 69 N. Y. 107 (1877).
'3Quintard
v. Knoedler, supra,note 12.
m
Comonwcalth v. Gorham, supra, note 12.
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one approaching from the place of work of Markusic, the plaintiff's
intestate, but it does not appear that Markusic ordinarily had any
business there. Neither does it appear that the defendant was in
any way negligent toward Gornick, though neither of these facts
are of importance under the Compensation Act. Nevertheless,
Gornick slipped and fell into the water. Upon hearing his cries
for help, Markusic dropped his work and ran to the rescue. The
steam hid the hole and Markusic fell into it. He died from the
scalding he received.
The case came -before the court under the Illinois Workmen's
i
Compensation Act of 1911
, which provided that the employer shall
pay compensation for "injuries sustained by the employee arising
out of and in the course of the employment." The question was
whether death came "in the course of the employment."
The court held that it did. "It is the duty of the employer to
save the lives of his employees, if possible, when they are in danger
while in his employment, and therefore it is the duty of a workman
in his employ, when occasion presents itself, to do what he can to save
the lives of his fellow employees when all are at the time working
in the line of their employment. Any other rule of law would be not
only inhuman, but unreasonable and uneconomical, and would, in
the end, result in financial loss to the employers on account of injuries to their employees."
There seems to be no direct authority in the United States for this
decision. But in Great Britain, under a similar act,2 the same
decision has been reached.3 No authority is cited for the result
reached in these British cases, but it is believed that they are correct
by analogy to certain common law rules.
In general at common law a master was liable to his servant for
injuries sustained in the course of his employment through the master's negligence, if the servant himself was guilty of no contributory
negligence. 4 It was further considered that, when an emergency
arose, a servant was impliedly authorized to leave his prescribed
duties and act in his master's interests to avert the unusual danger.
In so doing he did not leave his employment, and, if he was then injured by the master's negligence, the mere leaving of his regular
employment and assuming new duties was not as a matter of law
contributory negligence which would have barred his recovery.'
'Illinois Statutes Annotated, sec. 5449 et seq.
2
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 6I Vict., c. 37), see. x, sub-sec. i.
These provisions of the act were re-enacted in the Workmen's Compensation Act.
19o6
(6 Edw. 7, C. 58).
3
Matthews v. Bedworth, I W. C. C. 124 (1899); London & Edinburgh Shipping
Co. v. Brown, 7 F. (Scottish Session Cases) 488 (1905).
4
1t seems hardly necessary to cite cases supporting such a fundamental rule.
See 26 Cyc. 1076; 34 Am. Dig. 605.
sThough the rule is nowhere stated in these exact words, the following cases
support this doctrine: Sears v. Cent. R. & Bkg. Co., 53 Ga. 630 (1875); Terre
Haute & I. R. Co. v. Fowler, 154 Ind. 682 (1900); Collins v. Cincinnati, etc.,
R. Co., r3 Ky. L. Rep. 670 (1892); Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mahan, 17 Ky. L. Rep.
1200 (x896); Poillon v. Louisville R. Co., 149 Ky. 707 (1910); Mullin v. Northern
Mill Co., 53 Minn. 29 (1893); Gamble v. Akron, B. & C. R. Co., 63 Oh. St. 352
(I9oo); Seley v. So. Pac. Co., 6 Utah 3i9 (i89o), reversed in 152 U. S. 145 (3894)
upon another point.
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But at common law there would have been in this case no emergency, in the technical sense of the word, for the master was under
no legal duty to rescue Gornick, nor was it legally to his interest
to have it done. And so Markusic would have left his employment,
defendant,
and would have acted as a mere volunteer, and the
6
not being at fault, would have been under no liability.
But under the Workmen's Compensation Acts a master is liable
for his servant's safety, irrespective of negligence. If Gornick had
been killed, his employer. would- have been liable for damages. It
is now to his interest to have Gornick rescued. Markusic is no longer
a mere volunteer, but is acting in his master's interests in an emergency, and so under the common law rule above noted, which should
not be deemed abrogated, has not left the course of his employment.
While at common law the jury might find actual contributory negligence sufficient to bar his recovery, this question is of no importance
under the statutes. It is sufficient that he was, without wilful intent,
injured in the course of his employment.
In connection with the Scottish case already cited it should be
noted that although the word "accident" or "accidental," as applied
to injuries for which recovery will be allowed, is declared to be used
in its ordinary meaning, as "an" unlooked-for mishap or untoward
event which is not expected or designed," 8 or "happening by chance,
unexpectedly" and not from "ordinary means, voluntarily employed,
in a not unusual or unexpected way,"9 yet this ordinary meaning
has been liberally applied. In this Scottish case a workman was
upon his own offer lowered into a ship's hold to rescue a man overcome by gas. The rescuer was himself overcome and died. Yet,
although the act which caused it was voluntary, and the result was
not unusual under the circumstances, the court held that this death
was by "accident." Apparently the court was influenced by the
liberal spirit of the statute, the intent of which is to insure the workmen against any loss caused by personal injuries received while
engaged in the employer's work. If this intention is to be effected,
the rules above quoted must be applied broadly, for workmen are
often required in the cotirse of their work to take risks in which
there is a known element of danger. To say that in such a case the
injury is not an accident, is to ignore the spirit of the acts.
Even in England, where the Workmen's Compensation Act has
been in force for nineteen years, many points are still undecided.
In America it is safe to say that, even in those jurisdictions which
earliest adopted a Compensation Act, a large majority of the questions which must arise as to its interpretation have yet to be answered. It is to be hoped that American jurisdictions will treat the
ODonahoe v. Wabash etc. R. Co., 83 Mo. 56o (1884); Evansville, etc. R. Co.
v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 102 (186i); Atlanta, etc. Ry. Co. v. Leach, 91 Ga. 419 (1893)
i Sherman
& Redfield, Negligence (6th ed.), sec. 85b.
7
London & Edinburgh Shipping Co. v. Brown, supra,note 3.
gFenton v. Thorley & Co., (19o3) A. C. 443. This is the leading English case
and is quoted as authority in Bryant v. Fissel, 84 N. J. L. 72 (1913) and in Boody
v. 9K. & C. M'f'g. Co., 77 N. H. 2o8 (1914).
Mutual Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 121 (1888).
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act as liberally as have their cousins across the sea, and will not limit
it and riddle it with technical distinctions and exceptions, as has too
often been done with statutes "in derogation of the common law."
Kenneth Dayton, 'X7.
Employer's Liability: Disease as within Workmen's Compensation Act.-An employer furnished his employees drinking water
containing typhoid bacilli. An employee died of typhoid fever and
his widow brought a common law action of negligence. The court,
in Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., x54 N. W. (Wis.) 640 (iqx5),
denied her right to recover, holding that the death was "accidental"
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law and that
her sole remedy was under that act.
The extent to which diseases are covered by such statutes is a
disputed question. Most of such statutes provide compensation
for accidental injuries and diseases proximately resulting therefrom.
This obviously includes diseases resultant from a violent and direct
application of force to the employee himself.' But the accident
may be a gentle application of force, as well as a violent one,2 nor
need it be a direct application to the injured employee. 3 In the principal case the accident was the presence of the baccilli in the drinking
water, and the disease was the proximate result of that accident.
Always in these cases the question arises; What is an "accident"
within the meaning of the act? It has been said that the word is
used in the lay sense4 , but the lay meaning is too uncertain to be
of value. One can imagine the following conversation.
"Was John Smith killed by accident?"
"No. He drank some water containing typhoid germs and died
of typhoid."
"Did he do it on purpose?"
"Oh, no! It was an accident."
The word is each time used in a legitimate, lay sense, and the
problem of determining whether John Smith's death was accidental
in the lay sense is unsolvable. Other cases define an accident as an
event unintended and unforeseen by anyone5. The better rule,
'Lloyd v. Sugg & Co., (igoo) iQ. B. 486; Newcomb v. Albertson, 85 N. J.L.
435 (1914);

Heileman Brewing Co. v. Schultz,

152

N. W. (Wis.) 446

(i915);

contra,Walker v. Lilleshall Coal Co., Ltd. (19oo) I Q. B. 488. An engine fitter
blistered his finger and infected it with red lead and oil. No compensation was
allowed. This case is clearly wrong if the blister is considered the accident,
and the infection the proximate result. The case apparently goes on the theory
that the subsequent infection was the so-called accident.
2
Matter of Plass v. Central New England R., 169 App. Div. (N. Y.) 826 (1915).
In Brintons, Ltd. v. Turvey, (19O5) A. C. (Eng.) 230, this theory was carried so
far that the settling of an anthrax germ in the employee's eye was considered an
accident.
3
Rist v. Larkin & Sangster, I56 N. Y. Supp. 875 (1915); Kelly v. Auchenlea
Coal Co., Ltd. i911 S. C. (Scotland) 864; Broforst v. s.s. "Bloomfield," 1913
W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 594; Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, i Scots L. T. R. (1913)
167; Aitken v. Finlayson, Bousfield & Co., Ltd., 1914 S. C. (Scotland) 770;
Brown v. Watson, Ltd., 914 S. C. (H. L.) (Scotland) 44.
4
Fenton v. Thorley & Co., Ltd., (1903) A. C. (Eng.) 443.
5
Walker v. Lilleshall Coal Co., Ltd., supra, note i; Steel v. Cammell, Laird &
Co., Ltd., (1905) 2 K. B. 232; Broderick v. London County Council, (19o8)
2 K. B. 807.
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however, seems to be that any event not intended or foreseen by the
injured employee himself is an accident. 6 Thus, in the principal
case, the presence of the bacilli in the water was not foreseen by the
employee, although the employer who was better informed as to the
outlets of the toilets might have foreseen it. Since the English
statute requires the claim for compensation to be made within six
months of the occurrence of the accident, the English courts hold that
there can be no accident within the statutory meaning, unless a
definite date when it occurred can be fixed7. This rule has been followed in some American jurisdictions, but it should be noted that
the New York statute refers its time limit to the date of the injury,
not of the accident.9 The requirement of a definite time can probably be eliminated in this jurisdiction.
On principle, there seems no reason under the statute for differentiating between an occupational disease and any other disease. Of
course in jurisdictions following the English requirement for a definite
time there can be no compensation for cumulative metallic poisoning,10 and, since the English statute was specifically extended to
cover occupational diseases," the English courts have indicated that
the claim should come under that section.'2 In any jurisdiction,
a disease such as tuberculosis arising from the "dusty trades"3 could
probably not be brought under the statute, owing to the difficulty
of establishing a connection between the employment and the disease.
Of a hundred tubercular cutlery grinders, it can be said with certainty
that fifty would be healthy but for their trade. But to say that
John Doe, a particular tubercular grinder, would be healthy but for
his trade is mere conjecture. This inability to connect the employment and the disease seems to be the true basis for the decisions in
many cases where the court says there is no accident. 14 Cases of
cumulative metallic poisoning, on the other hand, would seem to be
within the statute. The connection between the trade and the
disease is certain. That the employee had received accumulations
$A premeditated assault may be an accident within the meaning of the act.
Trim Joint District School v. Kely, (1914) A. C. (Eng.) 667. Accord, Challis v.
London & S. W. Ry. Co., (1905) 2 K. B. 154; Nisbet v. Rayne & Burn, (191o)
2 K. B. 689; Anderson v. Balfour, (I91O) 2 I. R. (Ireland) 497; Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 151 Pac. (Cal.) 398 (1915); contra, Murray v. Denholm &
Co.,
7 (I9I1) S. C. (Scotland) io87.
Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., supra,note 5; Eke v. Hart-Dyke, (i91O)
2 K. B. 677.
sLiondale, etc., Works v. Riker, 85 N. J.L. 426 (1914); Adams v. Acme Lead
Works, 182 Mich. 157 (1914).

OWorkmen's Compensation Law, see. 28.
'Hitchens v. Magnus Metal Co., 35 N. J. L. Journal 327 (1912); Adams v.
Acme Lead Works, supra, note 8.
"See the 3d schedule of 6 Edward 7, c. 58, passed in 19o6.
nBroderick v. London County Council, supra, note 5; Eke v. Hart-Dyke,
supra, note 7.
"Cement making, cotton-ginning, grain handling, grinding, marble working,
pottery making, etc.
"1Ma.rtin v. Manchester Corporation, (1912) W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 289;
Spence v. Baird & Co., Ltd., 1912 S. C. (Scotland) 343; M'Millan v. Singer Sewing Machine C6., Ltd., 1913 S.C. (Scotland) 346; Ritchie v. Kerr, 1913 S.C.
(Scotland) 613.
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of poison prior to the employment would seem to be immaterial,
since a constitutional tendency toward the kind of injury received
does not affect the right to compensation.' 5 There is little difference
between an emaciated stoker who dies of heat that would not affect
an ordinary man,' 6 and an employee so charged with accumulations
of metallic poison that he succumbs to subsequent doses that would
not affect an ordinary man. Some courts attempt to distinguish
occupational diseases on the ground that they are foreseen, and hence
are not accidents.' 7 If this means that it is foreseen that a certain
per cent. of the workers are sure to succumb to the disease, it is an
utterly unjustifiable basis of decision. Such a doctrine would be
irreconcilable with the theory and principle of workmen's compensation legislation. 8 In such a sense, it is foreseen that a certain percentage of structural steel workers will succumb to violent injuries,
yet there is not the slightest doubt that such injuries are accidents
within the statute. If the word "foreseen" means that the injured
employee foresaw that he would actually succumb to that particular disease, there is little basis for that presumption. No employee
enters an employment in the spirit of sacrifice, knowing he will die
therefrom, and willing to submit for the sake of the wage. The
employee is always firmly convinced that he will be one of the lucky
survivors. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the educated
workman who realizes the risk avoids these dangerous occupations.
It is the ignorant, uneducated workman, who often does not know
that the substances with which he works are poisonous, that enters
such trades. That others, better informed, foresee the possibility
of his injury is immaterial. 19
As yet, New York has taken no decided stand as to what diseases
come under the act. Recovery has been allowed for frost-bite,2 0 and
in Rist v. Larkin & Sangster,21 it was allowed where the accident was
not a direct or violent application of force to the employee. It should
be noted that Bacon v. Mutual Accident Ass.,22 cited in the dissenting
opinion of the principal case for the proposition that New York will
not hold disease an accident, clearly goes on the ground that disease
was specifically excepted by a clause in the policy. The recent constitutional convention, by providing specifically for legislation in
"Hensey v. White, (i9o) I Q. B. 481; Lloyd v. Sugg, supra, note i; Ismay,
Imrie & Co., v. Williamson, (I9O8) A. C. (Eng.) 437; Clover, Clayton & Co., Ltd.
v.Hughes, (igio) A. C. (Eng.) 242; Maskery v. Lancashire Shipping Co., Ltd.
(I914) W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 290.
16Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson, supra, note 15.
17
Lead poisoning held not foreseen or unexpected, because a certain minority
of workers were certain to suffer in that manner. Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co.,
Ltd., supra, note 5. Accord, Walker v. Lilleshall Coal Co., Ltd., supra, note i;
Broderick
v. London County Council, supra, note 5.
' 8The purpose of workmen's compensation legislation is to charge the inherent
trade hazards against the trade product. Matter of Rheinwald, x68 App. Div.

(N. Y.) 425 (1915).

"See cases cited in note 6.
20Linck v. Millard, 4 N. Y. State Dept. Rep. (1915) 385; Cole v. Callahan &
Sperry, 4 id. 348.
2'Supra, note 3.
2I23 N. Y. 304 (1890).
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regard to compensation for occupational diseases,2 showed its evident
belief that the present constitution does not authorize such legislation. But the present constitution authorizes compensation for
"injuries, ' and there is no doubt that disease is an injury. New
York25 is apparently free to follow the broad rule of the principal
case.
L. I. Shelley, '17.
MasterandServant. Contractsof Employment: Indefinite Period.The recent case of National Life Insurance Company v. Ferguson, 69
Southern Rep. (Ala.) 823 (1915), and a recent New York case 1 again
raise a question, the solution of which is the cause of conflict
among the courts of the United States and England. In the Alabama
case plaintiff in Chicago received a letter from the office of defendant
company in Alabama saying that, if he desired to work for it, he
would receive "$15o per month" until he was needed in other places;
and in that event he was to receive" $25 per week" and a commission.
Plaintiff finished the work in Chicago and then went south for the
company. The court held that this latter was a hiring by the week,
and could not be terminated except at the end of each unit or period.
The decided cases in the United States and England fall into three
grouts, each establishing a different rule. In England where no
time is limited expressly or impliedly for the duration of the contract
of employment, the hiring is presumed to be general and for a year;2
and where the hiring is, in the first instance, general, and the employment continues over the year, in the case of clerks and "respectable"
servants, as distinguished from domestic or menial servants, it cannot be terminated without grounds for dismissal or withdrawal,
except at the end of each current year;3 but the court in this case
refrained from discussing what notice to quit, if any, is requisite
to terminate a contract under a hiring like the one there under
consideration, though it intimated that probably three months
would be sufficient. The rule, however, is not inflexible, and
must be considered in connection with the particular circumstances
of the case.4 An engineer was engaged at a salary of "5OO
pounds per annum." He was dismissed at three months' notice.
It was held to be a yearly hiring, and he recovered his salary
for the part of the year unexpired. 5 The manager of a shop, who
was paid his salary of 3o pounds a year monthly, was held to
23
Proposed constitution of 1915, Art. i, sec. I9.
2
Y. Constitution, Art 1, sec. 19.
2 TN.

6As to whether disease is an accident under accident insurance policies, see
Hood v. Maryland Casualty Co., 206 Mass. 223 (1910); Columbia Paper Stock
Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 104 Mo. App. 157 (1904);
IrS. Co., 112 N. Y. 472 (1889);

Paul v. Travelers'

Mutual Accident Ass. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 1oo

(1889).
1

Houghtaling v. Upper Yittanick Brick Co., 92 Misc. (N. Y.) 228 (915.)

2
Fawcett v. Cash, 3 N. & M. (Eng.) 177 (1834).
3
4Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. (Eng.) 309 (1827).

Baxter v. Nurse, 6 Man. & G. 935 (Eng.) (1844). In this case Tindal, C. B.
said, "It is not a rule of law that a general hiring is for a year, but a question
for the jury, depending upon the facts of each particular case."
6Buckingham v. Surrey Canal Co., 46 J. P. (Eng.) 774 (1882).
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have been hired for a year; 6 but, where a manufacturer's agent
was hired at a yearly salary, the hiring was held not a yearly one.
as there was a well proved custom in this business that a month's
notice was sufficient for dismissal.7 In the case of a clerk, who was
hired at a certain salary "per annum" and was discharged before the
expiration of the year, it was held proper to let it go to the jury to
say whether he could recover for the balance of the year, as a previous
contract between him and his employer had been rescinded upon a
month's notice.8 The language of Pollock, C. B., in this case would
seem to indicate that any indefinite hiring of a clerk could be terminated upon a three month's notice. However, it would seem that
the question as yet has not come up squarely. The general hiring
of agricultural laborers is for a year.9 In the case of menial or domestic servants there is a well established exception to the rule. In
the absence of circumstances to raise a different presumption, the
contract between a master and domestic servant is a contract to
serve for a year unless a definite time is stated, the service to be
determined by a month's notice by either party, or by the payment
of a month's wages, subject, of course, to the implied condition that
the servant will obey all the lawful orders of his master.10
The doctrine applied by a great majority of American courts
which have so far expressed an opinion on the subject consists
essentially in the repudiation of the presumption that a general
hiring is a hiring for a year, and the substitution of another presumption, viz., that such a hiring is a hiring at will; but there is a substantial conflict in determining what a general hiring is. The rule
in Alabama and some other states is that in order that a hiring be
for an indefinite time, there must not be the least semblance of an
express or implied time. A hiring for a certain sum "per year,"
"per month" or "per day" places the employer under a contractual
duty to employ and the employee to serve for a year, month or day,
as the case may be. A hiring at a yearly, monthly or daily wage
raises the presumption that the employment is to extend for a year,
month or day." The burden is upon the one so claiming to prove
an indefinite hiring. Contracts of employment where there is no
time mentioned or where the employment is to be "permanent" or
"regular" are held to be general.1 In California and a few other
states, a hiring at a certain sum "per year," "per month" or "per
day" is controlled by statute, and the employment is held to endure
for the period with reference to which payments are made.3
In New York and some other states a hiring stated to be at so
much "per year," "per month" or "per day", no duration being
6
Davis v. Marshall, 4 L. T. (n.s.) (Eng.) 226 (i86r).
TParker v. Ibbetson, 27 L. J. C. P. (Eng.) 236 (1858).
TFairman v. Oalford, 29 L. J. Ex. (Eng.) 459 (186o).
1'Lilley v. Elwin, i Q. B. (Eng.) 742 (1848).
0Turner v. Mason, 14 M. &W. (Eng.) 112 (1845); Moult v. Halliday, (1898)
1Q. B. (Eng.) 125.
uMagarahan v. Wright, 83 Ga. 773 (1889).
uLord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596 (1889); Louisville & Nashville R. P. v. Offutt,
99 Ky. 427 (896).
"California Civil Code, seC. 2010.
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specified, is held primafacie to be an indefinite hiring, and determinable at the will of either party;14 and the question of whether the hiring
was for a definite or indefinite time is always a question of the intention of the parties, and the burden of showing that the contract
was for a definite time is upon the one so claiming. 5 So, where the
contract is silent regarding the duration of the employment, a custom
well known to each party to make such contracts for a year, was held
to be sufficient indication of an intention to contract for a year.'5
And so, where a man enters another's employment under a contract
for a year, and continues in the employment thereafter, the presumption is that the parties have consented to the continuance of the
contract for another year.'7 In Houghtaling v. Upper Kittanick
Brick Co., supra, it was held that a resolution which was passed "to
make plaintiff general manager for the ensuing year at a salary of
$2,000 per year" made a contract for a year.

The English rule seems to be a- survival of old English local customs;18 and some of the English courts have expressed dissatisfaction
with it. 9 For the Alabama rule it is argued that the contract is for
the period or unit with reference to which payments are made,
and that a new contract is entered into at the beginning of each period;
but the question still remains whether the parties, when they enter
into the agreement, have any definite time in mind when they will
be discharged of the obligation by performance. It is not reasonable
to infer that men when they are employed at a salary per year,
month, or day believe that they are being bound for a year, month
or day; but rather they understand that the employment depends
upon the will of either party. It might also be urged against the
rule, and it was so decided in one Alabama case,2 0 that contracts of
this description are too uncertain to show the real intention of the
parties in the absence of other evidence, and that there is no contract at all. However, the Alabama court later returned to its
earlier view.21 The New York rule seems to operate as it should,
namely, to give effect to the intention of the parties.
George W. Dunn, '18.
Partnership: Retiring Partner's Lien on Firm Assets.-In the
case of Rapple v. Dutton, 226 Fed. 43o (1915), decided on appeal
from the Northern District of California, one partner purchased his
copartner's interest and undertook to pay the firm debts. Later
the purchasing partner founded a corporation which became insolvent. This was an action by the retiring partner to compel the
14Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 148 N. Y. I17 (1895); Watson v.
Gugino, 204 N. Y. 535 (1912); Gressing v. Musical Instrument Sales Co., 169
App. Div. (N. Y.) 38 (1915).
15Davis
v. Poineer Life Insurance Co., i8i Mo. App. 353 (1914).
'6 Beck v. Thompson Spice Co., io8 Ga. 242 (1899).
7
38Adams v. Fitzpatrick et. al., 125 N. Y. 124 (1891).
' Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Roberson, 3 Colo. i42 (1876); Wood, Master
and9 Servant (2d ed.), sec. 136.
10Huttman v. Boulnois, 2 Car. & P. (Eng.) 510 (1826).
2 Howard v. East Tenn., Va. & Ga. R. R., 91 Ala. 268 (I89O).
"Clark v. Ryan, 95 Ala. 4o6 (189x).
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trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation to apply a fund, arising
from assets of the old partnership, to the payment of firm debts.
The petition was not allowed, the court announcing the principle
that, though the firm debts are assumed by the purchasing partner,
the firm assets in his hands cannot be reached by the selling partner.
"A partner's Hen on firm property is not a legal or possessory lien,
but an equitable lien; that is, a right to insist that the partnership
effects shall be applied to the payment of partnership debts so that
he may be exonerated from personal liability therefor."' This
equity or right may be waived by the partner, as by a sale of the
retiring partner's interest in the firm to his copartner or to a third
person, the purchaser assuming all firm debts.2 Even where the
purchasing partners give a bond with sureties to discharge all firm
debts, the retiring partner who is arrested for firm debts has no claim
on the assets of the old firm in preference to creditors of the new firm.'
For the retiring partner's lien on the assets is substituted the personal4
liability of the continuing partner for the whole amount of the debt.
To be sure, each partner was and continues to be liable to creditors
for the whole, but this change is brought about by the transaction
between the parties, namely, that the purchaser becomes the prindpal debtor and the retiring partner only a surety, so that in case the
latter is forced to pay, he has a right of indemnity. 5
A creditor's right to reach firm property is merely derived from the
equity of the partner and is dependent on it,6 and when the partner
waives his equity the claims of the creditor are carried away. A sale
of a partner's
interest, however, does not free the assets, if the firm
7
is solvent.
If the agreement by which a partner sells his interest, either to his
copartner or to a third person, specifically provides that the assets
shall remain liable for the debts of the firm or that a condition of
the sale is that the firm debts shall be paid, then the lien is preserved
and the assets may be reached either by the retiring partner or by the
firm creditors. 8 Even though a creditor is not a party to the contract of sale and assumption of debts, a majority of the states allow
130 Cyc. 453; Pearl v. Pearl, i Tenn. Clh. 206 (1873); Wiggins v. Blackshear,
86 Tex. 665 (1894); Reddington v. Franey, 124 Wis. 59o (19o5); Hobbs v.
McLean,
117 U. S. 567 (1886); Payne v. Hornby, 25 Beav. (Eng.) 280 (1858).
2
Ketchum v. Durkee, i Barb. Clh. (N. Y.) 48o (1846); Blackwell v. Bank,
97 Tex. 445 (1904); contra, Conroy v. Woods, 13 Cal. 626 (1857); Shackelford's
Adm'r. v. Shackelford et. al., 32 Gratt. (Va.) 481 (1879). In the latter case the

partner who purchased the assets bound himself to pay the firm debts. He died
leaving assets of the former partnership. The court allowed the petition of the
outgoing partner to have the firm assets applied to the firm debts.
43Ex parte Fell, io Ves. Jr. (Eng.) 347 (18o5).
Coffin v. McCullough's Adm'r, 3o Ala. 307 (1857);

Ketchum v. Durkee,

supra, note 2; Blackwell v. Bank, supra, note 2; Thayer v. Humphrey, 93
Wis.
276 (1895).
5

Allen v. Cooley, 53 S. C. 414 (1898).
OReddington v. Franey, supra, note I.
v. Durkee, supra, note 2; Bulger v. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459 (1890).
McGown v. Sprague, 23 Ala. 524 (1853); Hatchell v. Chew, 22 Ky. Law Rep.

7
Ketchum
8

738 (1900):

Williams v. Bush, i Hill (N. Y.) 623 (1841); White v. Parish, 20

Tex. 688 (1858); Reddington v. Franey, supra, note I; Ex parte Wood, L. R.
IOCh. D. (Eng.) 554 (1879).
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him to recover against the purchaser in the character of a beneficiary
of the contract.9
It follows, therefore, that the result reached in this case is correct.
By the sale of his interest in the firm the partner released his lien
on the assets and cannot now claim them for the payment of firm
debts. The retiring partner's remedy lies in an action against the
continuing partner to recover any amount he may be obliged to pay
on old accounts.
Don C. Allen, 'x6.
Procedure: Meaning of Recoupment, Counterclaim and Set-off
under the Code of Civil Procedure.-In an opinion recently handed
down by the Court of Appeals in the case of Seibert v. Dunn, 216
N. Y. 237 (1915), the court seemed to indicate that the code counterclaim includes what was formerly denominated recoupment at
common law and that there is no recoupment now as separate from
counterclaim.
The action was brought by an assignee of a claim for a sum of
money, which arose under a contract between the defendant and the
plaintiff's assignor,, to recover the sum assigned. The defendant
sought by his answer to defeat recovery, through proof that after
the sum demanded by the plaintiff had been assigned, the assignor
violated the contract under which the sum became payable and thereby caused the defendant damage. The trial court held that the
defendant could not recover, because the counterclaim under the
code did not make provision for such a case. The Court of Appeals
decided, however, that the claim was one which might have been
set up in recoupment prior to the code and that, therefore, it could
and should be set up as a counterclaim under the code.
Recoupment at common law was available to a defendant who,
while admitting the existence of a cause of action in the plaintiff,
sought to reduce the amount of his recovery. it had its origin in
judicial decision and was confined to actions upon contract where
the defendant might set up as a defense damage accruing to himself
by the breach on the part of the plaintiff of the same contract. It
was merely a defense, however, and could do no more than defeat
the plaintiff's recovery and so, even where the defendant showed
damages exceeding those of the plaintiff, he could not get affirmative
relief in recoupment.1
9

Bessemer Say. Bank v. Rosenbaum Grocery Co., 137 Ala. 530 (1902); Morris

v. Marqueze, 74 Ga. 86 (1884); Dunlap v. McNiel, 35 Ind. 316 (1871); Poole v.
Hintrager, 6o Iowa 18o (1882); Gillen v. Peters, 39 Kan. 489 (i888); Francis v.
Smith, i Duv. (Ky.) 121 (1863); Reynolds v. Lawton, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 596 (1892);
McGibbon v. Walsh, 1O9 Wis., 670 (19Ol);

contra, Lee v. Fontaine, IO Ala.

755 (1846); Goodenow v. Jones, 75 Ill. 48 (1874); Wild v. Dean, 3 Allen (Mass.)
579 (1862); Ayres v. Gallup, 44 Mich. 13 (188o); Manny v. Frasier, 27 Mo.
419 (1858); Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa. St. 235 (1877); McCarteneyv. Wyoming
Nat. Bank, i Wyo. 382 (1875).

For a fuller discussion of the doctrine see, Waterman, Set-off (2d ed.), 489;
Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights (3d ed.), sec. 731; 34 Cyc. 623; Peuser
v. Marsh, 167 App. Div. (N. Y.) 604 (1915).
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In the principal case it would seem that the damage suffered by the
defendant did not arise out of the same contract and so there could
be no recoupment. In discussing this the court reasons that, since
the right under the assignment was based on the original contract,
the two causes arose out of substantially the same contract and,
therefore, there could have been recoupment at common law and
so counterclaim under the code.
It would seem that the decision is in line with the other authorities on
the subject,2 although the New York courts have been loath to accept
the proposition that recouizment was not still in existence as a separate
remedy from counterclaim. It was stated in Vassear v. Livingstont
that recoupment still existed under the code. This doctrine was
attacked in a later case, Deeves and Son v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.,'
although in that case Cullen, Ch.J., in a dissenting opinion held
that recouT-ment still existed as a separate remedy. Following
the dissenting opinion in the Deeves case the Appellate Division in
the recent case of Peuser v. Marsh,5 reaffirmed the Vassear case.
In the Vassear case the facts were similar to the principal case.
The assignee of a claim brought suit upon it and the defendant
alleged as a counterclaim a contract with the assignor and a breach
thereof by the assignor. 'No reply was served to this answer and the
defendant, claiming that his averments were admitted, demanded
judgment. The court, in rejecting his claim, said that the two causes
did not arise out of the same contract and so there could be no
counterclaim. As stated above, the principal case abandons this
rule and allows counterclaim in such a case. By the first subdivision
of the code definition of counterclaim, 6 the claim must tend in some
way "to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery," and must be
"a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth
in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim." The
common law definition of recoupment 7 is that it is a right in the
defendant to set up a breach of the same contract upon which the
plaintiff is suing. It is obvious that the definition of counterclaim
includes that of recoupment and it would seem, therefore, that the
reason for the coexistence of recoupment and counterclaim is lost.
Counterclaim is much broader than recoupment. While recoupment applies only where the breach is of the same contract and only
goes to the extent of defeating the plaintiff's recovery., counterclaim
will afford affirmative relief if necessary and includes 8 (i) causes
arising out of the contract set forth in the complaint, (2) causes
arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint, (3)causes
connected with the subject of the action and (4)in an action on
contract, aily other cause of action on contract, existing at the commencement of the action. 9
Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights (3d ed.), sec. 736; Wait's New York
Practice (2d ed.), 3165.
3I3 N. Y. 248 (x855).
4195 N. Y. 324 (199o).
s167 App. Div. (N. Y.) 604 (1915).
6New York Code Civ. Proc., sec. 5Ol, subd. i.
7

Supra, note I.
'New York Code Civ. Proc., sec. 5oi.
'But see limitations upon this latter class of cases statedin sec. 502.
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It is to be noted that in section 150 of the Personal Property Law10
the legislature continued the use of the term recoupment. By such
use it would seem, at first blush, that the legislature intended that the
remedy should still exist. But perhaps a better view of the intention
of the legislature would be that they meant to use the term as denoting the species of counterclaim which might go to defeat the plaintiff's recovery, but which might not result in affirmative judgment.
The court in Peuserv. Marsh, supra," in discussing this section, held

that recoupment still exists as an independent remedy and that it
need not be set up as counterclaim. As noted above, the authority
relied upon for the proposition was the dissenting opinion in the
Deeves case and, in the light of the principal case, it would seem that
the prevailing opinion in the Deeves case, that recoupment must now
be set up as counterclaim, is the law of the state and that the Court
of Appeals intends to follow it as being such.
It does not follow, however, that, since recoupment has been
taken over by the code as a whole, the same is true of the doctrine of
"set-off." While generally it might be taken as a rule that set-off
must be set up in counterclaim, there are classes of equitable claims
not provided for in the code counterclaim which are still in existence.
Chief among this class of cases is the one where insolvency, on the
part of the party against whom the set-off is claimed, has intervened.'2 In such case equitable set-off may still be pleaded as such,
although it would not be a counterclaim within the wording of the
code. The other exception exists in such cases of mutual credits3 as
are allowed to be set-off in equity and which would not be within
the statutory counterclaim. These two exceptions exist still in
New York and are recognized by the courts as proper cases for setoff. So, while it would seem that recoupment no longer exists in
New York as such, but merely as a species of counterclaim, it appears
that set-off is taken over by the code counterclaim, but is not
wholly absorbed.
Frank B. Ingersoll, '17.
Real Property: Nature of Tenancy by the Entirety.-The nature
and characteristics of joint estates in New York are brought quite
forcibly to our attention for review by the decision in the recent case
of Matter of Klatzl, 216 N. Y. 83 (1915). The Court of Appeals,
by a court divided in three ways, held that one half of a certain piece
of property conveyed by John C. Klatzl to himself and wife, with
the express provision that they should hold as tenants by the entirety, was subject to a transfer tax upon the death of said John C.
Klatzl.
loSection 150 of the New York Personal Property Law reads, in part, as follows: "Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller the buyer may, at his
election, accept or keep the goods and set up against the seller the breach of
"
warranty
by way of recoupment ...
"12See note in i CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY, 126.
' Richards v. La Tourette, fi9 N. Y. 54 (189o); 34 Cyc. 636.
13jones v. Robinson, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 310 (1857); Pond v. Harwood, 139 N. Y.
11 (1893).
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Three of the four judges, whose opinions formed the basis of the
decision, held that, notwithstanding the expressed intention of the
grantor to create a tenancy by the entirety, such an estate was not
created, but instead a tenancy in common was created, upon the
transfer of the husband's share of which a tax should naturally be
levied. The chief judge, whose opinion swung the final decision
in favor of the tax, argued that, although a tenancy by the entirety
was created by the conveyance, one half of the property was subject
to the tax because the wife did not obtain the right to the exclusive
use and enjoyment of all the property until the death of Klatzl,
and that, therefore, her rights in one half of the property vested because of the death of her husband sufficiently to bring the case within
the contemplation of the statute creating the tax.
This latter view seems quite out of harmony with the accepted
conception of a tenancy by the entirety. The title of the wife to the
whole property vests immediately upon the giving of the original deed
creating the tenancy.' She acquires no new interest in the property
from her husband upon his death.2 His death does not act positively in creating any new right in her different from any which she
already possessed. It acts negatively upon her, in that it terminates
the husband's rights in the property, which rights were purely personal, depending on his life for their existence, and consequently,
being absolutely extinguishedby his death, they are incapable of transfer to anyone thereafter. The cases dealing with this tenancy speak
of the survivor's title to all the property as remiainingin him after the
death of the other tenant.3 Under this view it seems impossible
that there is anything which passes to the wife upon the death of
the husband and which is capable of being taxed. It has been held4
that the survivor of a joint tenancy is not subject to the transfer tax,
and by analogy it seems clear that the survivor of a tenancy by the
entirety should not be, and the authorities seem to tend in that
direction. 5
The most interesting phase of the case, however, is presented in
the argument of the dissenting opinion to the effect that a tenancy
by the entirety was created and that consequently, upon principle
and authority, no tax should be levied. It seems obvious that, were
this deed given by a third person to husband and wife in this form,
a tenancy by the entirety would be created. The only difficulty
in construction, therefore, lies in the fact that the conveyance of the
property was made by Klatzl to himself and wife. The authorities
seem quite clear on the point that one cannot convey to or receive
a conveyance from himself. 6 Therefore, unless we are to consider
that the husband and wife, as grantees of the estate together, form
an entity legally separate from either individual, as they did at common law, we must hold that, under the above rule, Klatzl was in'Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152 (1883).
'Matter of Thompson, 85 Misc. (N. Y.)
'Steltz
v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263 (I89i).
4

291

(1914).

In re Heiser's Estate, 85 Misc. (N. Y.) 271 (1913).
of Thompson, supra, note 2.
Cameron v. Steves, 9 N. Bruns. (Canada) 141 (1858).

6
Matter
6
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canable of taking an estate in the property under a grant from himself. However, there seems to be authority for the proposition that,
as grantees of the property, husband and wife do form an entity
apart from either individual. Unity of person of husband and wife
for purposes of receiving property was the basis of the creation of
the estate, and it would seem that, in as much as we have retained
the estate in our law, in so far have we also retained the unity theory
of husband and wife; the only difference being that the husband is
no longer the master of the entity, as he was before the Married
Women's Acts.7 By statute husband and wife are permitted voluntarily to partition an estate by the entirety.' To do so is to convey to one's self, unless as owners of such an estate husband and wife
are considered an entity. The fact that the statute brought forth
no comment on this point would seem to indicate that the entity
theory is accepted. 9
However, even admitting that it is impossible to create a tenancy
by the entirety by a conveyance by a husband to himself and wife,
why should not the wife take title to the entire property alone under
such a grant? We are told that, where one of several grantees is
incapable of taking under a certain grant, those who are capable
shall take all the title, if under the grant they were to be joint tenants. 0
Clearly under th-s grant they were to be joint tenants (as a tenancy
by the entirety is really a form of joint tenancy), and it would seem,
therefore, that the wife should take the entire estate and consequently
would not be subject to any tax upon the death of her husband.
The objection that to give this effect to the conveyance is to vary
the intention of the grantor is no less valid as against a construction
making them joint tenants.
The decision in this case has at least served to stimulate interest
in the character of these joint estates, if nothing more, and it is
apparent from it that the law as to them is not even now absolutely
established.
Mahlon B. Doing, 'x6.
Real Property: Nature of Interest of Inchoate Dowress.-In
Rumsey v. Sullivan, r66 App. Div. (N. Y.) 246 (zg94), a deserted
inchoate dowress sought to restrain the defendants, the husband's
vendees, from exhausting oil land. The court held that an inchoate
dower right was insufficient basis for an injunction. Kruse, J.,
dissented, holding the right was a valuable interest which has always
been protected when threatened.
7
Hiles v. Fisher, x44 N. Y. 3o6 (1895), illustrates the proposition that the husband's
the entire rents and profits of the property during his life did not
spring right
from to
the peculiar nature of the estate,
but merely from his common law
interest as husband in al of his wife's property. Why then should the mere taking away of this right by statute affect the unity theory as regards the estate
itself?
See also 2 Reeves, Real Prop., sec. 689.
8
Sec. 56, N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law.
9But see Dressler v. Mulhern, 77 Misc. (N. Y.) 476 (1912), where it is held,
on very doubtful authority, that a tenancy by the entirety can only be created
by a conveyance from a third person to husband and wife.
'°Cameron v. Steves, supra, note 6. Sheph. Touchstone, page 82. See also
Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656 (I915l.
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"It is difficult to state exactly the nature or qualities of an inchoate
dower interest. Vagueness of expression attends all discussions." 1
Text writers have called the inchoate dower right "an estate or at
least an interest in land; ' 2 "an interest; ' ' 3 "contingent right only." 4
The cases vary. "The right is merely an inchoate expectancy" ;5
"no interest of any nature; ' 6 "property in the nature of a vested
right;"7 "protected as much as dower consumate;" 8 " as firmly founded
as the husband's fee." 9 The best cases take a middle view:--"a
valuable, subsisting, separate interest, entitled to protection;"' n0
"more than a possibility, property with incidents sui generis;"
12
"inchoate right of value, protected by law."
Cases refusing the right of action to protect the dowress are suits
by a widow against adverse holders. The statute of limitations is
a good defense, if the action accrued during coverture. The court,
in its effort to aid the dowress, has frequently held that the cause of
action did not accrue during coverture' 3
Whatever the proper terminology, equity has usually disregarded
it and granted relief. "An inchoate doweress has an action to
protect dower.""4 "The purpose is her protection. It15 may not
but only
be impaired by the husband or his successors in 1title,"'
6
"by operation of law, prior death, or her consent."
Specifically we find that the right, being merely in action, not possession, is non-assignable, but may be released. 17 It is an incumbrance on title and its release is consideration.' 8 The legislature
1

McLcan, J., in Johnson v. Vandyke, 6 McLean (U. S. Cir.) 422, at 44o (1855).

22 Scribner, Dower (2d ed.), Chap. r, sees. 3--2o, especially sec. 7.

Kent's Commentaries (i4th ed.), 5o.
Reeves, Real Property (2d ed.), page 66o; I Tiffany, Real Property, page 466.
sCravens v. Winzenburger, 97 Ill. App. 335 (19oI); Randall v. Krieger, 23

34
4i

Wall. (U. S.) 137 (1874).
GMoore v. Mayor, 8 N. Y. 110 (1853), now limited to eminent domain pro-

ceedings.
7

Fitcher v. Griffiths, 216 Mass. i74 (1913).
'Mills v. Van Voorhies, 2o N. Y. 412, at 42o (1859).
v. Courtney, 77 Mo. 587 (1883).
'Williams
1

0Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298 (1873), limiting Moore v. Mayor, supra,

note 6; Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N. Y. 383 (1895).
nBrown v. Brown, 94 S. Car. 492 (i913); Fitcher v. Griffiths, supra, note 7.

2Dennis v. Harris, case 30027, Supreme Court of Iowa, 153 N. W. 343 (91S),
not officially reported. See also, 70 Am. St. R. 624; 5 L. R. A. 519; Kelley v.
McGrath, 7o Ala. 75 (1881); Pennington's Executor's v. Yell, ii Ark. 212
(1850); MeNear v. MeNear, 142 Ill. 388 (1892); Haggerty v. Warner, X48 Ind.
625 (1897);

Buzick v. Buziek, 44 Iowa 259 (876);

Fowler v. Chadima, 134

Iowa 210 (1907); Williams v. Williams. 89 Ky. 381 (889); Flynn v. Flynn, 171
Mass. 312 (1898); Baker v. Atchinson etc. Co., 122 Mo. 396 (1894); Adler Co. v.
Hellman, 55 Neb. 266 (1898); Scott v. Howard, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 319 (1848);
Van Blaricum v. Larson, 146 App. Div. (N. Y.) 278 (I9II); Bell v. Golding,
151 App. Div. (N. Y.) 945 (1912); Hilton v. Sloan, 37 Utah 359 (1910).
121 Reeves, Real Property (2d ed.); page 663, note 5; i Tiffany, Real Property,
page
469, note 239; for example, see Taylor v. Lawrence, 148 Ill. 388 (1894).
1
"Simarv. Canaday, supra, note io.

v. Moor, 14 Tenn. 528 (i911).
"Crenshaw
1

6Adler Co. v. Hellman, supra, note 12; Van Blaricum v.Larson, supra,note 12;
L. R. A. 340, at 342.
"Davenport v. Gwilliams, 133 Ind. 142 (1892); 27 L. R. A. 340.
'$Porter v. Noyes, 2 Greenl. (Me.) 22 (z822); Mills v. Van Voorhies, supra,
note 8; Nins v. Beiglow, 45 N. H. 343 (1864).
27
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may bar dower in after-acquired lands;19 retroactive legislation has
sometimes been upheld. 19 Forfeiture on divorce is constitutional. 9
The husband's fraudulent conveyance, though before marriage, may
be set aside and thewife's joinder, fraudulently obtained, isnobar; 0
nor is a rule forbidding actions between husband and wife. 2t Public
policy prevents the wife demanding compensation in eminent domain,
but the husband must provide for her from the proceeds ;2 likewise proceeds in partition;23 or surplus on foreclosure or execution under claim
barring dower (e. g. incurred before marriage, for purchase money
or with assent)24. The wife may redeem from liens ;25 or a tax sale
without notice to her.26 Without special statute, the husband's
creditors under claims incurred after coverture and not defeating the
husband's seisin ab initio, cannot defeat the wife.Y But purchase
money mortgages or vendors' liens, defeating seisin ab initio, bar
dower.21 Bankruptcy proceedings are no bar;29 nor adverse possession during 31
the husband's lifetime. 9 The inchoate dowress may
be estopped.
There is no binding authority on the right of an inchoate dowress
to restrain waste. Reeves and Tiffany state that she may neither
bring waste nor ejectment. 32 Phelps v. Phelps," cited by Mr. Reeves,
is based on insufficient seisin by the husband. The other cases
19
As to constitutionality of statutes divesting dower, see 2 Scribner, Dower
(2d ed.), chap. i, sees. 7--20; r Reeves, Real Property (2d ed.), pages 660 et se ;
I Tiffany, Real Property, page 467. But contra, Van Blancum v. Larson,
supra, note x2. Where divorce is not recognized, New York will not enforce
forfeiture.
20 Higgins v. Higgins, 219 Ill. 146 (igo5); Buzick v. Buzick, supra, note i2;
Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen (Mass.) 3o5 (1863); Bonfoey v. Bonfoey, oo Mich. 82
(1894); Simar v. Canaday, supra, note IO; Youngs v. Carter, io Hun (N.Y.)
194 (1877; Clifford v. Kampfe, supra, note io.
2"Fitcher
v. Griffiths, supra, Aote 7.
22Baker v. Atchinson etc. Co., supra, note 12; Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N.J.
Eq. 534 (1875); Moore v. Mayor, apparently contra as to dower attaching to
proceeds. Superceded by Simar v. Canaday, supra, note io; In re BroOklyn
Bridge,
75 Hun (N. Y.) 558 (1894).
3
jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 386 (1839).
3
Vreeland v. Jacobus, 19 N. J. Eq. 231 (1868); Paton v. Murray, 6 Paige
(N. Y.) 474 (1837); Vartie v. Underwood, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 56I (1854); Citizens
Bank v. Mooney, 26 Misc (N. Y.) 67 (1899); De Wolf v. Murphy, i i R. I. 630

(1877); Hoy v. Warner, zoo Va. 600 (39o2). Contra, Grube v. Lilienthal,
S. Car. 442,-statutory assent divested all rights.
25Kauffman v. Peacock, II5 Ill. 212 (1885); MacKenna v. FidelityTrust Co.,
1846 N. Y. 411 (19o6); Atwood v. Arnold, 23 R. I. 6o9 (1902).
2 Henze v. Mitchell, 93 Neb. 278 (i913).
2'Pennington's Extrs. v. Yell, supra,note 12; Buzick v. Buzick, supra, note I2;
Scott v. Howard, supra,note 12; Lewis v. Smith, 9 N.Y. 502 (1854); McClurg v.
Schwartz, 87 Pa. St. 52 (3878).
2Sullivan v. Sullivan, 139 Iowa 679 (I9O8); semble, Unger v. Leiter, 32
Ohio St. 210 (3877).
"Lazear v. Porter, 87 Pa. St. 513 (1883); aff'd, 109 U. S. 84 (1885).
2OTaylor v. Lawrence, supra, note 13; Williams v. Williams, supra, note 12.
Contra, Winters v. DeTurk, 133 Pa. St. 359 (189o); Hart v. McCollum, 28 Ga.
478 (1859).
"1Adler Co. v. Hellman, supra, note 12.
321 Tiffany, Real Property, page 469, note 239; 1 Reeves, Real Property
(2d ed.), page 663, note 5.
33143 N. Y. 197 (1894).
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cited are ejectment against adverse holders and the adverse holder is
not laying waste to the property. They are governed by the policy heretofore discussed and are not in point.
Hammond v. Pennock4 says the inchoate dowress cannot protect
dower. The authorities cited do not support the dictum. The case
was decided on insufficient seisin. Selden v. Mann 5 has dicta that
a life tenant not yet entitled to possession cannot maintain waste.
The case is contra to Brashear v. Macey. 31 Furthermore a dowress
is more favored than a life tenant. In Palus v. Latta" the action for
waste was expressly excluded from the decision. Minn., etc. Co. v.
Lund)8 states, "Though she might be unable to maintain an affirmative action . . . . she may defend."
On the other hand an inchoate dowress has frequently been
protected.V3 9 In Shepard v. Manhattan, etc. Co.,40 a widow, dower
unassigned and resting in action only, maintained waste. In Brown
v. Brown4' equity compelled third parties to hold the property in trust
for dowress. In Brown v. Brown et at4 the husband's vendees were
cutting timber. One was insolvent. The court unanimously held
that the inchoate dower right possessed attributes of prolerty and in
case of substantial waste it would benefit everyone to settle all
rights. The injunction was granted. The case is on all fours with
the principal case.
From the above discussion it appears that the New York court
was not bound by decisions. The purpose of dower is to protect.
The courts have in each situation, as it arose, protected the dowress.
Here the husband has left the wife unsupported. There is no procedural difficulty. By the acts of the husband and his grantees
she has been deprived of any chance of ever enforcing her rights,
yet the court refused any remedy. The case should be accepted
with caution, since future cases may, at least as to legal waste, be
rigorously distinguished. The court may, when the point is raised,
adopt Judge Kruse's view. The case is to be supported, if at all,
on the ground that this may have been equitable waste only.
Emmons G. Swift, '16.
Sales: Implied Warranty of Fitness for Purpose.-Section 96,
subdivision i, of the-New York Sales Act' provides that "Where the
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for -which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment (whether
he be the grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
The corresponding sections of the English2 and the Canadian 3 Sales
3461 N. Y. 145, at 158 (1874). 302 N. Y. Legal Observer 328 (1844).
3626 Ky. 89 (1829).
3793 Ind. 34 (1883). 1891 Minn. 45 (1903).
-Cases cited in notes i4-30, supra. 4024 New York State Rep. 185 (1889).
4182 N. J. Eq. 40 (1913). 4Supra, note xi.
'Chapter 571, Laws of r9i.
256 and 57 Victoria, c. 71, sec. 14 (1894).
3R. S. of Saskatchawan, chap. 147, sec. 16 (19o9); see also R. S. of British
Columbia, chap. 2o3, sec. 22 (1911); R. S. of Manitoba, chap. r74, sec. 16 (i933).
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of Goods Acts are practically identical with that of New York.
But, while the English and Canadian Courts have put a broad,
liberal interpretation upon their acts, the New York courts, in their
latest expression, Bonwit, Teller and Company v. Kinlen, 165 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 351 (1914), have shown a tendency to apply a narrow
construction to the statute.
In the Kinlen case, the purchaser, the wife of a wealthy man
who supplied her lavishly with money, so that she had no need for
careful or close buying, was a lady of little or no knowledge or experience in the choice of textures and wearing apparel. She entered
the plaintiff's store, a very large retail establishment, and on being
told by a saleslady that the goods in a certain dress and waist were
of "the finest material that they could put in the dress for the
money," purchased the articles for the rather high price of $xiS.
Later the waist developed pink spots and the dress contained"pulls,"
a condition of the warp which might have been remedied in the
manufacture. In an action to recover the purchase price of the waist
and dress the respondent set up the breach by the seller of an implied warranty of fitness.
The court held that the sale did not come within section 96,
because, to show that the buyer made known the purpose for which
the goods were to be required, he "must disclose some special purpose for which the goods purchased were to be used"; and further,
that a "mere purchase from a retail dealer does not sufficiently raise
a presumption that the buyer relied on the skill or judgment of the
seller:"
So narrow a construction was hardly to be expected after the liberal
views taken by the lower courts in New York before the Kinlen case.
In Marx v. Locomobile Co.4 there was a purchase by an order in
writing, of a particularly specified automobile truck, and it was
made known to the manufacturer that it was to be used to carry
asphalt. The heat from the asphalt caused the iron to warp, and it
was held that there was "an implied warranty that the wagon should
be reasonably fit for the purpose of carrying asphalt."
Shearer v. Kakoulis5 held that there was an implied warranty on
a sale to the purchaser in person, that a player piano was suitable for
the purpose for which it was intended to be used. Leahy v. Essex
Co." held that the sale of some chocolate pie in a lunchroom carried
an implied warranty that the pie was fit for consumption, and the
same was held in Race v. Krum,7 in the case of a sale of ice cream.
The English courts have taken a similar attitude on this question.
In Preistv. Last' it was held that the purchase of a hot water bottle
by a draper from one skilled in that business was such a circumstance
as "showed that the buyer relied on the skill or judgment of the seller," the gist of the reasoning being that this dealer in cloth, who
'82 Misc. (N. Y.) 468 (1913).
6144 N. Y. Supp. 1077 (1913).
4148 N. Y. Supp. 1o63 (1914).

7146 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1914), aff'd, 147 N. Y. Supp. 8M8 (I914).
2 Y. B. 148 (1903); see in this connection the dissenting opinionby Lehman
J., in Bonwit, Teller and Company v. Kinlen, 85 Misc. (N. Y.) 62 (1914).
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was totally unskilled in the matter of hot water bottles, showed,
in buying the bottle from the chemist who made it a part of his
business to supply such bottles, that he relied on the skil and judgment of the seller rather than on his own.
On the same reasoning it seems apparent that the sale by the experienced saleslady of the large retail store to Mrs. Kinlen, one of its
ordinary customers, whose knowledge was obviously inferior to that
of the seller, was also such a circumstance as showed a reliance on
the skill and judgment of that seller.
In Frost v. Aylesbury Co.9 action was brought for a breach of
warranty in respect to a sale of some milk delivered daily at the
buyer's house. The contract was held to be for the sale of food, for
the court held that "no one would question that the milk was bought
as an article for consumption." Evidence on that point was considered quite unnecessary, for the purpose of the purchase was so
apparent that it would be reasonably assumed by every one.
It seems quite as reasonable to assume that the waist in the Teller
case was purchased for the apparent and ordinary purpose of wear
and use, and that no one would question that that was the use to
which an article of apparel, for which so high a price was paid,
would ordinarily be put. It certainly does not seem necessary that
the buyer "disclose some special purpose for which the goods were
to be used."
Canada, too, makes this interpretation of the statute.
CanadianFairbanksCo. v. Thompson'0 found an implied warranty
that an engine, which was purchased by mail, on a written contract
of sale, to be used as a sample, could be operated for sale and exhibition purposes, while Carlstadt Co. v. Alberta Co." held that there was
a breach of warranty on a sale by sample in which the seed purchased
was not reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was intended.
The Kinlen case must not, however, be taken as final authority
on the subject. The court was much handicapped by the fact that
counsel for the respondent merely alleged that the goods were not
of as high a quality as the buyer expected to get for the amount paid.
He did not lay stress on the expression or implication by the buyer
of the purpose for which the goods were required, nor did he attempt
to show clearly a reliance by the buyer on the skill and judgment
of the seller. The case was not taken to the Court of Appeals.
When the question is decided by that tribunal, it is hoped that the
rule laid down in the English cases above will be followed.'2
A good paraphrasing of the subdivision to fit like cases would seem
to be this:---Where goods are sold for an evident purpose, and it
appears that the buyer relies on the skill and judgment of the seller
* * * there is an implied warranty * *

Henry Klauber, '17.

9x K. R. 6o8 (I9O5); see also Gillespie Co. v. Cheney Co., 2 Q. B. 59 (i896);
Strongetharm v. North Lonsdale Co., 21 T. L. R. 357 (1905); Cointat v. Myham,
2 K. B. 220 (1913); Williamson v. Macpherson, Se. Ct. Sess., 6 F. 863 (I9O4).
1*17 W. L. R. 580 (19ii).
"21 W. L. P- 433 (1912).
nMarmet Co. v. People's Co., 226 Fed. (Ohio) 646 (i915), assumed, in a written contract for the sale of second-hand coal barges, that there was an implied
warranty that the barges were reasonably fit for the purpose intended. See Ohio
Gen. Code, sec. 8395 (I).
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Sales: Vendor's Lien: When Delivery Complete.-Plaintiffs sold
on credit to George A. Alden & Co. and the New York Shellac Co.
200 cases of shellac which were at the time stored in a warehouse.
Plaintiffs held the warehouse receipts which were negotiable in form.
These were indorsed and transferred to the purchasers on Feb. 13,
1913. On Feb. 14 one of the purchasers went to the warehouseman
and requested that new receipts be issued, but this was refused because
the warehouse charges on the shellac were not paid. A few days
later the purchasers became bankrupts and the plaintiffs, on learning
the buyers were insolvent, paid the warehouse charges and demanded
delivery, which was refused. Defendants are the trustees in bankruptcy of the purchasers and were substituted for the warehouseman
in the action of replevin. The court held that the plaintiff's lien
as unpaid seller was lost when the receipts were negotiated. Such
act was in effect equivalent to an actual delivery of the goods. Rummell v. Blanchard,216 N. Y. 348 (.915).
This case presents the question as to whether the delivery of a
negotiable document is sufficient to destroy the vendor's lien.
At common law the assignment of a document of title was not
sufficient to destroy the vendor's lien. The warehouseman or other
bailee did not become the agent or servant of the assignee, until he
was notified of the transfer and by attornment consented to become
the agent of the assignee.' Until this was done, possession remained
in the bailee for the original bailor and such goods might become
the property of a subsequent purchaser, if he received an attornment
from the bailee, or they could be attached by a creditor of the bailor.
Such a document was regarded as a contract between the original
parties and, being merely a chose in action, it was subject to the
common law rule that choses in action are not assignable. The
assignment would be effective against the assignor,3 but as against
others than the assignor it was ineffective; therefore, in order to be
effective against the bailee or warehouseman, it would be necessary
for the bailee to be notified of the assignment and consent to it.
The common law made no distinction between an order or bearer
document and a straight document.
But, according to the mercantile theory, the transfer of an order
or bearer document constituted a manual delivery
4 of the goods
and an attornment by the bailee was not necessary.
By statutes (Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, Uniform Bills of
Lading Act and Uniform Sales Act) a distinction is drawn between
an order and a straight document. The indorsement of an order
'Quintard v. Bacon, 99 Mass. 185 (1868); Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass.
(1875); Bassett v. Camp, 54 Vt. 232 (188).
Hallgarten v. Oldham, 135 Mass. I (1883); Gill & Co. v. Frank, 12 Ore. 507

325
2

(885).

'Parsons v. Woodward, 22 N.J. L. 196 (1849); Second Nat. Bank of Toledo v.
Walbridge,
i9 Ohio St. 419 (1869).
4
First National Bank v. Railroad, 58 N. H. 203 (1877); Weyand v. Railroad,
75 Iowa 573 (1888); Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 130 U. S. 416
(1889); Scharff v. Meyer, 133 Mo. 428 (1896); American Nat. Bank v. Henderson, 133 Ala. 612 (1899).
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documenthas theeffect of an actual delivery of the goodsthemselves, 6
and attornment is no longer necessary to create the new relationship
of bailor and bailee, in order to have possession in the buyer. The
statutes have made no change in regard to the transfer of a straight
document of title.
The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act provides that "A person
to whom a negotiable receipt has been duly negotiated acquires
thereby the direct obligation of the warehouseman to hold possession
of the goods for him according to the terms of the receipt as fully
as if the warehouseman had contracted directly with him."6 Therefore, since the receipts in the case under discussion were order receipts,
and the receipts were indorsed and delivered to the defendants,
this was all that was necessary to put the goods into the possession
of the defendants. Possession being the basis of the plaintiffs'
lien, it must necessarily follow that the lien was destroyed by the
indorsement of the receipts to the plaintiffs.
Herman B. Lermer, '17.
Trusts: Right of Cestui Que Trust to Terminate the Trust,-The
recent case of Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co., z68 App. Div. (N. Y.)
6or (1915), raises a very interesting question in the law of trusts.
In that case a testatrix bequeathed $50,000 in trust, to pay the
income to her husband during his life, and on his death the trust
was to cease and the principal revert to her residuary estate. In
compromise of a claim against the estate, the residuary legatees
and remaindermen assigned their entire interest in the trust fund
to the husband, the plaintiff in this action, and empowered the trustee
to pay over the $So,ooo fund absolutely to him. The trustee refused
to make the transfer on the ground that he had no legal right to do
so, and this suit was brought to determine that question. The holding of the court as summed up by Mr. Justice Dowling was that
"as under the law in existence at the time of the decedent's death,
and the probate of the will, the interest of the plaintiff was inalienable,
either by assignment or otherwise, not even his acquisition of the
remainderman's interest could operate to destroy the trust, under
which he was entitled to the life estate only, nor terminate in any
way his life estate, nor enlarge it into an absolute ownership of the
whole fund. He is entitled to the life estate; he owns the remainder
but there is no merger of the two operating to destroy the trust, in
view of the prohibition of the statute." This result is reached by
a construction of section I5 of the Personal Property Law and the
effect is that, although the beneficiary has an absolute, indefeasible
interest, because both the life estate and the remainder are vested
in him, yet he can never, during the life of the trust, obtain possession
of the fund.
In New York the law as to the ability of the beneficiary to alienate
has changed from time to time. Before 1830 the common law' pre5Commercial Bank of Selma v. Hurt, 99 Ala. 130 (1892); Union Trust Co. v.
Wilson, 198 U. S. 530 (i9o4); Ammon v. Gamble-Robinson Commission Co.,
iii Minn. 452 (I9Io).
eNew York General Business Law, section 125.
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vailed. On January i, 1830 the Revised Statutes took effect. Included were provisions for the regulation of trusts of realty. A
cestui que trust of the rents and profits of realty was prohibited from
disposing of his interest.' By construction of this section, all realty
trusts were included, whether the beneficiary was sui juris or non
sui juris. Anticipation either voluntary or involuntary was restrained.2 This construction was, by judicial reasoning, without
statutory warrant, and against strong dissent, applied to trusts of
personalty, the ground of construction being that the policy of the
law was alike in each case.3 In 1893 the section was amended so
that when the beneficiary of a real property trust became entitled
to the remainder, the trustee's interest would cease.! In 1897 the
Personal Property Law was enacted. It included provisions for
trusts of personalty and specifically provided that the beneficiary's
interest in the income from trusts of personalty should be inalienable, but allowed a determination of the trust when the cestui became entitled to the remainder.5 In 19o3 the provisions in the law
of 1897 in regard to trusts of personalty were amended so that
the statute was silent on the point whether the trust determined
when the beneficiary became vested with the remainder. The beneficiary's interest was still declared inalienable. 6 In 1911 the provision that the income from personalty trusts should be inalienable
was reenacted with additions not important to consider here.7 The
law as it now stands in New York, therefore, is that the cestui cannot
voluntarily alienate his interest in a trust for the income of realty
or personalty, and, while formerly his interest was subject to involuntary alienation only in so far as it was not necessary for his
support "according to his education, habits, and associations,",
it now seems, under a recent amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, available to creditors only through garnishment proceedings.9
In 19o9 a statutory method of revoking a trust was provided by
the legislature.?0 This statute applies only to a case of the creator
of a trust who is allowed to revoke when all beneficially interested
give their written consent. All cases which have so far arisen under
this statute have been to determine who are such beneficiaries."
The law in New York as to whether the parties to the trust or
the court can dissolve a trust seems to be definitely settled against
Ii R. S. 730, sec. 63.
2Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige Ch.(N. Y.) 237, 240 (1841); Tolles v. Wood,
993N. Y. 616, 617 (1885).
4Graff v. Bonnett, 31 N. Y. 9 (1865).
Laws of 1893, chap. 452.
5Laws
of 1897, chap. 417; Pers. Prop. Law, sec. 3.
6
Pers. Prop. Law, see. 15; Laws of 1903, chap. 87.
7
Laws of 1911, chap. 327.
9"Kilroy v. Wood, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 636 (1886).
New York Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 1070, 1391; Pistchal v. Durant,
154 App. Div. (N. Y.) 447 (I9M5).
"Pers. Prop. Law, sec. 23.
"Sperry v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 154 App. Div. (N. Y.) 447 (1913);
Whittemire v. Equitable Trust Co., 162 App. Div. (N. Y.) 607 (1914); Crackanthorpe v. Sickles, i56 App. Div. (N. Y.) 753 (913); Goodwin v. Broadway Trust
Co.- 87 Misc. (N. Y.) 130 (1914).

NOTES AND COMMENT

dissolution, except for the statutory method mentioned above. Under
the law as it now exists one judge has quoted with approval the
statement that "no act of the cestui que trust, the trustee, or the legislature, or all three combined can terminate a legal trust created for
a legal period until the time set for expiration by the testator."' 2
The argument of the cases seems to be as follows: the legislature
has said that such interests are inalienable, and it is not competent
for the parties or the courts to do that which will give such interests
an alienable quality. For this reason trusts either of realty or
personalty are treated with the same policy; 3 it makes no difference
that the beneficiary is sui Juris;14that all persons interested petition
for abrogation of the trust;"5 that litigation may impair the fund; 6
and most important of all, whether there is a contingent limitation
over, or the life beneficiary has become absolutely and indefeasibly
vested with the remaindermen's right to the principal fund.17
The only distinction which the courts have taken as bearing on
the question of dissolution is whether the trust is created by the
settlor for himself or for others. This distinction is important
in determining the rights of creditors. The courts have been very
slow to permit the destruction of trusts, even when the parties
were expressly empowered in certain instances to do so by the acts
of 1893 and 1897. The statutes were attacked as unconstitutional
on the ground that they authorized taking property, i.e., the legal
title, from the trustee without due process. 18
The courts of other states not controlled by statute have had the
question before them. The view taken depends largely on questions
of public policy. In practically no case will a mere dry passive
trust be continued against the will of the cestui. 9 The test in active
trusts is, How far shall the intention of the testator be carried out?
Universally the answer is, In so far as it is not contrary to some rule
of law or public policy. No court will allow a trust to be dissolved
when the interests of the beneficiary are contingent or he is mnosui
Juris.20 On the other hand, if the trust scheme is practically completed, if the beneficiary's interests are vested, and the beneficiary is
sui Juris, and no good reason can be shown why the trust should
longer exist, equity has power to dissolve the trust.2" Dissolution
will also be permitted on the petition of all interested parties, if the
interests are vested and the beneficiary is sui Juris."
12Matter of Kirby, 113 App. Div. (N. Y.) 705, 711 (19o6).
1Graff v. Bonnett, supra, note 3.
"4Douglas v. Cruger, 8o N. Y. 15 (188o).
15
Douglas v. Cruger, supra, note 14; Lent v. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169 (1882).
"6Cuthbert
v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326 (1893).
7
' Greer v. Chester, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 329 (I89i), aff'd, 131 N. Y. 629 (1892);
Asche v. Asche, 113 N. Y. 232 (1889); Cass v. Cass, 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 235
(1897); Lent v. Howard, supra,note I5; Lewis' Estate, 3 Misc. (N. Y.) 164 (1893).
18Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., I8x N. Y. 39 (1905); Oviatt v. Hopkins, 20
App. Div. (N. Y.) 168 (1897).
"Claflin
v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 22.
20
Anderson v. Williams, 262 IIl. 308 (3914).
21Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395 (1888); Fox v. Fox, 250 Ill.
384 (1911).
2Anderson v. Williams, supra,note 20.
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The court in the principal case seems to have overlooked a distinction which might be made. The statute prohibits the alienation
of the beneficiary's interest under a trust to receive the income
from personalty. It does not prohibit the alienation of any legal
interest. If the trust can be ended by a merger, the only interests
left will be legal interests. Why not allow the merger and then hold
that the statute concerning alienation of trust interests has no application? The statute was not intended to provide for indestructibility of trusts, but to provide against alienation of trust interests.
The court seems to have confused alienability and indestructibility.
B. F. Sovocool, *z6.
Wills: Abrogation by Recorded Agreements.-The case of Henderson v. Bishop, 95 Atl. (Pa.) 663 (i915), presents the question whether
an agreement executed by all the devisees or legatees or both under a
duly executed will, that they shall refrain from presenting the instrument for probate and shall allow the property of the testator to be
divided according to the intestate laws, as if the testator had died
intestate, is enforcible to the extent that such an agreement will
operate as a bar to a proceeding for the probate of the will thereafter
instituted. The principal case does not stand alone in holding that
a contract by devisees and legatees, made subsequent to the death
of the testator and which purports to nullify and revoke a will, is
enforcible. 1 The courts in this class of cases have based their
decisions on grounds of public policy and expediency, such as the
desirability of avoiding family controversies and litigation, and seem
to have overlooked and disregarded certain fundamental and underlying principles as to the effect of testamentary documents. While
the proper result may have been reached in a majority of the cases
actually decided, and public policy satisfied so far as these particular
cases are concerned yet the way in which the courts have attained
these results and the course of reasoning which has been followed
do not seem to be in accord with a true public policy. This holding
seems to invite rather than suppress family litigation; renders uncertain the titles to property; and, besides, is opposed to certain
fundamental notions of the legal effect of valid testamentary documents.2
The power of a person to dispose of his property by will is wholly
derived from statute.
Statutes conferring this power prescribe
certain arbitrary rules and formulas, by which the owner of property, real or personal, may effect a transfer of that property upon
his death to those whom he desires to benefit. By putting upon the
statute books a law giving to the owner of property the power to
140 Cyc. 2107; Matter of Stone, 132 Iowa 136 (I9O6); Bunn v. Bartlett, 8
N. Y. Supp. i6o (1889); Phillips v. Phillips, 8 Watts (Pa.) 195 (1839); Stringfellow v. Early, Y5 Tex. Civ. App. 597 (1897).
2
See Page on Wills, sec. 346; "But, to concede to the beneficiaries the Tight
to suppress a will * * * and to refuse to probate a will which is in itself
perfectly valid, by reason of a subsequent agreement between the heirs and
beneficiaries, is so contrary to the policy of the law of wills that on sound principle the position seems untenable." Finch v. Finch, 14 Ga. 362 (1853); Epps v.
Dean, 28 Ga. 533 (I859).
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dispose of it by a validly executed will, the state thereby holds out to
a person taking advantage of the statutory authority that a duly and
properly executed testamentary instrument shall be given full effect
in so far as the state, acting through its courts, has power to carry
such instrument into operation. The state becomes in effect a
guarantor, an insurer, to a competent testator that his valid testamentary wish shall not be disregarded. Under these statutes, it is
well established that a validly executed will may not be revoked or
rendered ineffective by any act of cancellation, mutilation or destruction committed by any third person or combination of persons,
whether beneficiaries or not, acting without the knowledge and
consent of the testator, whether such act be performed before or after
his death. If this be true, it would seem incumbent upon the courts
to reach the logical holding that no act of third persons between
themselves may prevent the probate of a duly executed instrument,
when presented by a proper party and in due time. A concrete
example will serve to bring out the point more clearly. A testator
devises seven-eighths of all his property to his son A, and one-eighth
to his son B; upon the death of the testator the inequity of the disposition bears upon A, so that he agrees with B, by a written instrument,
based on a consideration, not to probate the will and to have the
property pass under the intestate laws; later, in contravention of
this agreement, A offers the will for probate and B sets up the written
instrument as a bar to the proceeding. Upon strict legal theory
and sound principle such an agreement should have no effect in
determining whether or not the will should be admitted to probate.
There is no doubt that contracts made by heirs and next of kin
not to contest a will are valid and based upon sound principle and
good public policy, as are contracts made after probate proceedings
for a different distribution than that provided for by the will;'
but the same reasons, the same public policy and the same principles
cannot operate to give effect to a contract made after the testator's
death and before the will has been offered for probate and providing
for the abandonment of the will and the distribution of the property under the intestate laws. In the two former instances there
is nothing to prevent the will from taking its natural and legal course;
whereas in the latter case the legally expressed intent of the testator
is defeated, and the guaranty of the state to protect and carry out
that intent has been avoided by the execution of an informal contract,
or, as is permitted in one jurisdiction, by a mere parol agreement
by the devisees and legatees not to probate the will.4 The fact that
the testator made a will is prima facie evidence that he did not intend
to die intestate, but that he did intend to avail himself of the right
given him by the statute to have his property disposed of upon his
death in a certain way which he has pointed out. Upon what grounds
of public policy can the state be relieved of its duty toward that
testator to carry out that intent as thus expressed? Upon what reason or principle do the courts base their power to prevent the operation of the statute with respect to a duly executed instrument?
Cyc. 2107; Page on Wills, supra, note
'Phillips v. Phillips, supra,note i.
34o
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If the courts are compelled to choose between a validly executed
will and a contract which, if given effect, operates practically to
revoke that will, there can be no public policy strong enough to induce
the court to depart from the rule laid down for thefa by the plain
terms of the statute. There is no direct authority given to the courts
for the abrogation of a valid will by the recognition of such a contract,
and neither necessity nor a desire to mete out justice demands such
abrogation. The proper result can be attained upon strict legal principle and sound public policy. That this result may be obtained is
evidenced from the consideration of a hypothical case. Suppose, as in
the preceding example, a testator devises seven-eighths of his real
estate to his son A and one-eighth to his son B. After the death
of the testator an agreement is made by the beneficiaries not to probate the will, but to allow the property to pass under the statute
of descent, and the contract is carried into effect by the heirs taking
possession and using the property without objection. Ten years
thereafter, A offers the will for probate and B seeks to prevent the
probate of the will by setting up the agreement executed by A and B.
Upon sound principle such an agreement should not be held to be a
bar to the probate of the will and the effect of the contract should
not be considered. Upon the probate proceedings the sole
question should be, "Is the instrument the valid last will and testament of the alleged testator?"
The operation of the will is not dependent upon the probate proceedings. If the will was validly executed by a competent testator
free from restraint, the instrument became operative at the moment
of the testator's death; 5 title to the real property devised by the will
vested immediately in the devisees named in the will, and could
not and would not be divested by any form of agreement providing
that the will should not be probated and that the property should
pass under the intestate laws. The interested parties cannot, by any
agreement made after the will has become operative, prevent from
vesting in the devisees a title which has already vested in them. The
agreement should not, therefore, bar the court from making record
evidence of the fact that the will has been properly executed by a
competent testator. It is not probate which makes the will or renders
it effective. The will has already spoken and it only remains for the
court in the probate proceedings to have this fact judicially determined.
While it seems clear, therefore, that an agreement of the character
described should not be held to avoid a will validly made or to prevent the probate thereof, it may frequently happen (and this is
what has actually occurred in most of the adjudicated cases dealing
with the question), (i) that the agreement providing for the passing
of the property under the intestate laws is sufficient in law in and of
itself to operate as a conveyance from one or more of the devisees
under the will to other devisees, or from the devisees to the heirs at
law; or (2) that the agreement has been executed by a subsequent
$4o Cyc. x895; Hall's heirs v. Hall, 47 Ala. 290 (1872); Simmons v. Spratt,
Fla. 449 (i89o); Wright v. Williamson, 67 Me. 524 (1877); Irving v. Bruen,
i1o App. Div. (N. Y.) 558, aff'd, 186 N. Y. 605 (19o6).
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conveyance or transfer of the property from the devisees to the heirs
at law; or (3)that, though there has been no conveyance from the
devisees, yet the agreement may operate as an agreement to convey,
or it may appear that the property has been put in actual possession
of the heirs at law, who have gained title by adverse possession.
But, whatever the nature of the agreement, there is no basis in law
for a public policy which justifies a court in giving effect to any agreement seeking to disregard a validly executed will.
J.Emmett O'Brien, '17.
Wills: Attempted PartialRevocation by Act on Instrument: Probate of Remaining Clauses.-A novel and interesting question in the
law of wills was presented in Matter of Kent, r69 App. Div. (N. Y.)
It appeared that, after execution of the will, the
388 (i915).
testator had cut therefrom one complete paragraph and a portion
of the residuary clause with evident intent to revoke the parts so
cut out, but without intent to revoke the will. The Appellate
Division, granting a new trial, directed that the whole will should
be admitted to probate, if the contents of the missing clauses could
be established, and if they could not be established, then the remaining clauses should be admitted to probate.
So far as the case holds that the established clauses could be probated without regard to the missing clauses, the decision is out of
accord with settled law and is not supported by principle. Whatever the testator's intention in excising particular clauses from the
will, her efforts thereby to effect a partial revocation were ineffectual.
The doctrine of partial revocation by act on the instrument does not
exist in this state.' Neither the will, nor any part of it, therefore,
had ever been revoked. If the contents of the missing clauses
could have been established, the whole will should have been admitted to probate; if they could not have been established, then probate should have been denied altogether. To hold
2 otherwise is
to evade the statute and to permit partial revocation.
Another, and perhaps more cogent, objection to the decision
is that it directed the Surrogate's Court to admit to probate an
instrument which was not the last will and testament of the testator.
A similar question was presented in Matter of Curtis,3 where the
will offered for probate contained an incomplete paragraph, in the
margin and opposite to which was written the word "cancelled,"
and the lower part of the page was torn off. The court said, "As
there was, therefore, no effectual alteration of any part of the will, or
revocation of the third paragraph thereof, if any will is to be admitted
to probate, it must be a will in the form and condition in which the
will Was when originally executed and witnessed."14 The rule adopted
in this state by a consistent line of decisions is that, where an attempt
at partial revocation fails, the will may be admitted to probate
in the form and condition in which it was when executed, if that
'Quinn v. Quinn, i Thompson & Cook (N. Y.) 437 (1873); Lovell v. Qlitman
88 N. Y. 377 (1882).
2Decedent Estate Law, sec. 34, and cases cited supra, note x.
3135 App. Div. (N. Y.) 745 (1909).
'Page 747, Matter of Curtis, supra, note 3.
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can be ascertained.5 And this seems to be
6 the general rule under
statutes not permitting partial revocation.
It is clear that, if the contents of the excised clauses cannot be
ascertained, and the remaining clauses are probated without them,
the result is to effect a new disposition through the remaining residuary clause, and this new disposition has never been made in a
manner authenticated by statute. The instrument is not, therefore,
the last will and testament of the testator. Even under statutes
permitting partial revocation, if the attempt at partial revocation
works an alteration, it is invalid, for to hold otherwise would be to
effect a new and different testamentary disposition in violation of
the statute relative to the execution of wills. 7 So it is held generally
that, if an attempted alteration is ineffectual for lack of statutory
execution, the alteration cannot take effect, but the will stands as
before, valid under its previous execution."
In the principal case there is both an ineffectual attempt at partial
revocation and an ineffectual attempt at alteration. The result
of which is, first, the will cannot be admitted to probate in its present
form, for in such form it has never been properly executed, and,
secondly, it cannot be admitted to probate as it was when originally
executed, for in that form it cannot be proved.
Leon A. Plumb, 'r6.
8

jackson v. Holloway, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 394 (i8ii); Matter of Ackerman,
App. Div. (N. Y.) 584 (I9O8); Matter of Wood, i44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 259
(1911); Matter of Van Woert, 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 483 (I91).
6Hartz v. Sobel, 136 Ga. 565 (i9ui); Wolf v. Ballinger, 62 Ill. 368 (1872).
Cases in all jurisdictions where pro tanto revocation is not permitted and sustaining the rule given are collected in a note to Hartz v. Sobel, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.)
797, at 8o5.
'Eschbach v. Collins, 6i Md. 478 (1883); Gardner v. Gardiner, 65 N. H. 230
129

(1889); Miles Appeal, 68 Conn. 237 (1896).
'Jackson v. Holloway, supra,note 5; Doane v. Hadlock, 42 Me. 72 (x856);
Dixon's Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 424 (1867); Quinn v. Quinn, supra,note I; Penniman's Will, 20 Minn. 245 (1873); Eschbach v. Collins, supra,note 7; In re Wilcox's
Will, 20 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1892); Hesterberg v. Clark, 166 Ill. 241 (1897); 1
Underhill on Wills, sec. 268.

